THE (PRACTICAL) MEANING OF PROPERTY
Vincent Chiappetta

Property, like liberty, security and resistance to oppression is one of the “natural and
imprescriptible rights of Man and of the Citizen.”1 Property is the means by which the
will acquires existence through the characteristic of being mine.2 “ …. Their lives,
liberties, and estates, which I call by the general name property.”3 Property is
“something owned or possessed.”4 “Property is robbery.”5

Property appears such a malleable concept one must wonder whether it means anything at
all.6

Establishing that it does requires taming the tendency of an unchanneled

definitional quest to meander between the grand ontological and the pedestrian look-itup-in-the-dictionary approaches to meaning. As the title indicates my focus is resolutely
practical – specifically, finding a meaning for property which frames our myriad related
public policy debates in a way which improves our understanding of the issues and
facilitates decision-making.7

Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law.
Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, INTRODUCTION AND NOTES BY GARETH
STEDMAN JONES 149 (Penguin Classics 2002) (referring to the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the
Citizen) (hereafter “Marx and Engels”).
2
Id., at 74 and 151 (citing to G.W.F. Hegel, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (ed., A.W. Wood,
1991) 76-8).
3
See John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True
Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, Sec. 123 at 155 (Yale University Press, Ian Shapiro ed.,
2003).
4
Merriam-Webster Dictionary Online at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/property.
5
Pierre Joseph Proudhon, WHAT IS PROPERTY? AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT AND OF
GOVERNMENT CHAPTER 1, located online at: http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccernew2?id=ProProp.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=1
&division=div2.
6
Most succinctly captured by Professor Thomas Grey’s blunt assertion that as property has no coherence it
could effectively be declared “dead.” Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property in PROPERTY:
NOMOS XXII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). See also, Abraham Bell and
Gideon Parchomosvsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 533 (2005) (stating that “the field
seems to be in insoluble theoretic disarray ….”).
7
Focusing the practical rather than musing on the “big truths” does not, of course, diminish the importance
or value of the latter to property debate as is discussed at length below. It merely reflects my view of the
1
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That fingerpost points away from the futile search for “the one true property law”8 and
towards treating the regime as an enormously flexible tool for allocating control over
society’s resources.9

Defining property as functional rather than inherently definitive

means it responds rather than dictates.

Each of the opening statements is transformed

from an imperative into a possibility. Nothing beyond societal will determines when and
how property will be deployed.

Nothing but our imagination limits the reasons for

which, nor the finesse and nuance with which, it can be applied.

Thus functionally

approached, “property” refers to society’s legal rules establishing who has the ultimate
right to control its resources, regardless of what those rules or resources may be and
however those rules may be normatively justified.10

appropriate priorities in a heterogeneous society. Cf. Charles Van Doren, A HISTORY OF KNOWLEDGE
(Ballantine, 1991) 66-67 (discussing how the practical Roman approach helped their society to endure).
8
To avoid consternation among philosophers, theologians and others so inclined, I should emphasize my
argument does not depend on (or assert) the non-existence of absolute truth nor does it preclude making
individual or group decisions firmly rooted in moral views. The crucial point is that regardless of our
individual certainty, the identification of a single absolute and universal truth continues to evade us as a
society. Consequently, defining property in terms of the “right” is a practically unproductive exercise.
See infra Parts II and III. My position, therefore, is neither relativist nor formally positivist. Although
others may feel compelled to label it as such, they risk missing the point.
9
There are indications (some very strong) that the dialog is coming around to this view. See, e.g., Peter K.
Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (providing a very
insightful analysis along these lines regarding the intellectual property debate). See also, Michael A.
Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L. J. 1 (2004), Anupam
Chander, The New, New Property, TEXAS L. REV. 715 (2003); Hanoch Dagan, Property and the Public
Domain, 17 YALE J. L. & HUMANITIES xx (2006); Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places, 114
YALE L. J. 991 (2005) (all arguing, in various ways, for a flexible view of property law). That property is
variable rather than having a single “true” substantive definition is also supported by history as noted by the
promulgators of the Doctrine of Saint-Simon: “this great word ‘property’ has represented something
different at every epoch of history.” Marx and Engels, supra note 1, at 173. See also, Francesco Parisi,
The Rise and Fall of Functional Property, xx (working paper on SSRN); Rose, supra, at 616 (noting the
supposition that property rights are unchanging is ahistorical).
10
The definition is refined in Part II to include varying kinds and degrees of control, obligations as well as
rights and status-based (membership in society) rather than transactional applicability. For those hungering
for immediate detail the relevant material is found infra at notes xx-yy and accompanying text. I chose
the word “functional” to emphasize the practical/instrumental, however, my objective should not be
confused with Professor Felix Cohen’s and others of his persuasions use of the term. See Felix Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach (35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935). Whereas
Professor Cohen was primarily interested in how the law is judicially applied (see id., at 824), or perhaps
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The effect on public policy debate is dramatic. Extricating property from our various
personal narratives regarding the right answer11 reveals the fundamental issue is not
“right or wrong,” good or bad” or even “yes or no.” Property encompasses all normative
justifications and all rules establishing whose, what kind and how much control.
Revering or fearing property, therefore, confuses personal preference with the regime
itself. It is not the hammer but our divergent views regarding its just use which should
be the focus of our debate.12 Sweeping assertions, paeans and vilifications of the regime
should be ignored in favor of understanding the underlying motivations: the beliefs,
desires, needs, concerns and fears they reflect. That shift will force us to confront our
many conflicting but equally strongly held views of the “right” which, deriving from
individual intuitions and beliefs, will stubbornly refuse to yield to our post-enlightenment
faith in reason. We must, therefore, recognize that in a heterogeneous society inevitably
one person’s over-propertization will be another’s under-propertization and no just right
exists which can fully satisfy all points of view.

Responding that resolving these irreducible differences can be safely left to the workings
of the political process (and most particularly to the majority’s will) ignores property’s

more broadly how that activity defines “what it is” (see id., at 828-829), I am not particular interested in
what the courts do but in the more formative public policy debate. The latter not only includes a large role
for the conceptual which Professor Cohen dismisses, but it would be reasonably to say that our conceptual
differences are my point. So I suppose I should add “not a legal realist” to my disclaimer regarding
relativism and positivism in supra note 10.
11
See Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Feminist Theory, 2 YALE J. L. HUMAN. 37 (1990) (making the point that how we tell the property story
based on our value perspectives affects how we come out).
12
Mechanical issues (whose, what kind, how much) will generate controversy but those differences can be
largely resolved by expert fine-tuning of the tool. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
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practical consequences.13 The regime determines which of society’s members control its
resources when there is not “enough and good enough” for all.14 Consequently, unless
property delivers on the promise of a reciprocally beneficial common enterprise by
affording each member sufficient control to pursue a rational life plan, the society will
not endure.15

The unraveling likely will only occur slowly in barely perceptible

increments rather than as a dramatic rupture.

It may or may not be a good thing. But

when it happens, as it must, the property discussion will no longer be governed by
politics even in its best sense. In fact, it is unlikely to be a discussion at all.16

The functional approach not only identifies the core property issue, it also offers an
alternative. By framing property as decision-making in face of equally strongly held and
equally unprovable conflicting truths it clarifies that, as a practical matter at least, “right”
in property is manufactured not revealed.

Consequently, public policy debate need not

be viewed as a forum for educating blockheads, converting pagans and exposing villains

13

Despite property’s explicit focus on contested resources the analysis still can usefully inform other public
policy decisions. Any debate which has insupportable effects because it deprives the losers of something
required to pursue a rational life plan is likely to generate similar consequences. That connection has lead
some to view “life or liberty” interests as being appropriate subjects of property. See supra note 3 (John
Locke’s definition of property as including “lives and liberties”); Van Doren, supra note 7, at 226-228
(discussing property in opinions, beliefs and rights).
14
John Locke’s famous caveat to his labor theory. See Locke, supra note 3, Sec. 27 at 112.
15
Sufficient control is not limited to accessing resources needed to exist. It also includes the ability to
realize one’s entire rational life plan including its less tangible aspects. That may require the ability to
limit or even prevent the use of resources by others even when not needed for the property owner’s
physical well-being or comfort. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text. The statement in the text
echoes John Rawl’s Difference Principle (and clearly the measuring concept of a rational life plan comes
directly from Rawls). See John Rawls, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 266 (Belknap Harvard Revised Edition,
1999). Its rests, however, only on the practical consequences, not any claim that it is a morally “just”
outcome. As noted below in text, see infra note 19 and accompanying text, the practical approach
explicitly does not make a value judgment regarding the failure to willingly compromise personal values
and beliefs. It merely points out that the practical consequences of failing to do so should be a significant
consideration. Finally, regarding dissolution of society, certainly the government must change. More
likely, however, society will itself dissolve. See Locke, supra note 3, Sec. 211 at 193 (distinguishing
between the two forms of dissolution).
16
See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
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to ensure one’s view of the one true path prevails.17

It can instead be treated as the

search for a practical solution which sufficiency delivers the goods to permit the
continuation of cooperative society.18

The alternative, however, is neither simple nor

mandated. There is no guarantee that such a solution exists or, that if it does and we
manage to find it, it will be adopted. That would require substantial number of us decide
to compromise or perhaps even abandon our personal beliefs. And whether we “should”
place fidelity to “the greater good” above adherence to our personal view of the right has
no definitive answer. The functional alternative cannot claim the status of meta-norm
demanding such subservience. In a world devoid of provable absolutes no precept can
(or should) make that claim.19 True to its pragmatic roots the approach only delivers on
its objective of clarifying property debate by identifying the actual issue.

Deciding to

make a principled stand on our view of the right despite the consequences to the social
enterprise, therefore, remains up to each of us, but at least the practical definition ensures
we will do so understanding what property and our decision is about.

This article develops the above thesis in three parts.

The first provides a very brief

introduction to the definitional issue, identifies some of the basic philosophical positions
and discusses how property pervades current public policy debate. The second explains
in Subpart A why property is most usefully defined functionally - as a legal means to

17

See Yu, supra note 9, at 9-11.
See infra Part III.
19
This is a problem with John Rawl’s Theory of Justice. See supra note 15. The powerful and I believe
convincing argument that his two principles of justice logically follow from the veil of ignorance assumes
away individual belief in normative trumps regardless of their consequences. For those that believe there
is an absolute right his argument collapses. Although I personally believe that cooperative heterogeneous
society is key to meaningful human existence, a fact undoubtedly apparent despite my efforts to avoid
editorial comment, I have explicitly labeled the functional approach “practical” not “just” to preserve
others’ right to disagree and chose differently.
18
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normative ends rather than as a particular end to be embraced or rejected.

Subpart B

explains why the word “property” can and should be retained as the genus label despite
concerns that its popular association with a relatively absolute subspecies will distort
debate. The third part demonstrates how the futility of identifying (or even agreeing on)
the “right” answer makes persistent normative disagreement inevitable in heterogeneous
society.

It concludes by explaining that because property outcomes which tangibly

deliver the goods are essential to survival of cooperative, mutually beneficial society,
seriously considering yielding normative ground is a worthwhile, albeit not obligatory,
exercise.

PART I: Definitional Precision and the Prevalence of Property

For many years only academics and philosophers (assuming they may not be the same)
seemed particularlyinterested in exactly what “property” means.20 Their efforts, while
hardly resolving the matter, have generated an impressive body of work.

It includes

definitions ranging from the powerfully blunt and uncompromising “sole and despotic
dominion”21 to the enormously refined “bundle of sticks”22 as well as an extremely

20

Those efforts are, however, prodigious. See Bell and Parchomosvsky, supra note 6, at 533-551
(providing a good summary and concluding by proposing a unified theory of property “organized around
creating and defending the value inherent in stable ownership”). I would add the non- or contra-property
philosophies of, for example the “socialist/communists,” (for lack of a better label) to that array for
completeness. See generally, Marx and Engels, supra note 1. See also,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Property (setting out a good overview of the numerous and varying
conceptions of property).
21
From William Blackstone 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 2 (facsimile ed. 1979),
available on line at: http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/blackstone/bk2ch1.htm. But see Carol M. Rose,
Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L. J. 601 (1998) for an interesting discussion
of the fact that Blackstone was less defining property than starting a discussion.
22
Professor Wesley Hohfeld’s contribution. See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710 (1917) and FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 67 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1923). For an
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creative and diverse collection of justifications including labor,23 individual selfdefinition and autonomy,24 first possession,25 divine right,26 utility27 collective good28 and
need.29

Policy-makers and the public may have lacked interest in that rarified debate

because plentyof unclaimed Lockean common30 or Marxist abundance31 permitted or at
least seemed to promise sufficiently uncompetitive exploitation of resources to make
theoretical precision largely irrelevant.

That has changed.

We now frequently find

ourselves reaching with numerous others for the same resources while making and facing
claims of remarkable complexity and nuance. As a result many highly energized public
policy debates now turn on precisely what having a property interest entails. In fact, and
amazingly (to me anyway), recent polls show that “private property rights” are at the very

detailed analysis and ultimate rejection of the “bundle of rights” approach as “little more than a slogan” see
J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996).
23
Credit goes to John Locke, see supra note 3, Chapter V.
24
See supra note 2 and accompany text for a brief paraphrase of G.W.F. Hegel’s point of view. Professor
Margaret Jane Radin offers an interesting elaboration and clarification of that argument in the context of
intellectual property in Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
25
Whether accomplished and justified by discovery or otherwise. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, SIMPLE
RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 59 (1995); Chander, supra note 9, at 723-741 (2003) (explaining and
criticizing the approach).
26
See Marx and Engels, supra note 1, at 167 (noting the argument that “God had given the earth to Adam –
one man and his legitimate heirs).
27
The Smith-Bentham-Mills market model made very popular in contemporary legal analysis by “Chicago
School” efficiency theory and currently a preeminent theoretical justification for United States property
law. For its connection to property law see, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, 546-550; Carrier,
supra note 9, at 26-30; Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347
(1967); Mark A. Lemley Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEXAS L. REV. 1031, 10371040 (2005); Rose, supra note 21, at 618-623.
28
There are a number of examples, culminating (perhaps) with the communist view that although private
property should be eliminated resources would still be “owned in common” for the common good. See
Marx and Engels, supra, at 154 (discussing the view as found in Roman law), 157, 167, 169 and The
Communist Manifesto, at 243. See also, Menell and Dwyer, Reunifying Property, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L. J.
599, 604-605 (2002) (discussing various native and early American common ownership schemas).
29
Even Marx, hardly a property enthusiast, must be seen as at least grudgingly acknowledging specific
allocations to individuals “according to their needs.” Marx & Engels, supra note 1, at 169. An alternative
“need” position grants current users only a usufruct right in trust to a resource making the satisfaction of
their need subject to consideration of past and future members’ interests. See, e.g., David Hurlbut, Fixing
the Biodiveristy Convention: Toward a Special Protocol for Related Intellectual Property, 34 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 379, at 385 (discussing such a position in the intellectual property field).
30
See Locke, supra note 3, Sec 27 at 33.
31
See Marx and Engels, supra note 1, at 174-5.
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top of the American citizenry’s concerns.32 The meaning of property suddenly seems to
be of very serious concern to virtually everyone.

Briefly considering a few specific examples illustrates just how prevalent and relevant
property is in today’s public affairs.

The following discussion also sketches, without

assessing, a few of the conflicting positions to provide foundational grist for the
definitional discussion in Part II.

An obvious starting point is the passionate debate which has erupted in “Takings”
jurisprudence as a result of the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo v.
City of New London33 and a lesser known but more legally dramatic voter-passed
initiative in Oregon.34

The Court’s 5 to 4 Kelo decision (over, to put it tactfully,

vigorous dissent35) essentially permits a governmental agency to condemn one person’s
private property into other private hands.36 Whether or not that decision actually created
new law37 it clearly found private real property ownership constitutionally subservient to
fairly expansive views of the public interest as defined and pursued by governmental
actors. The case triggered substantial adverse reaction from a significant segment of the
public who expressed considerable outrage at the decision’s (and Court’s) lack of respect

32

See New York Times, Sat. July 30, 2005, Front page (story continued and citation on page A10).
xx U.S. xx; 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). See, e.g.,, Martin Lasden, The Great Property Rights Revival, Feb.
2006 CAL. LAWYER, 22 (2005); John Gibeaut, Taking Control, DEC. 2005 ABA 45 (2005); New York
Times,supra note 32.
34
Oregon Measure 37 was passed in the 2004 General Election and is codified at ORS 197.352. For
discussion of the measure see Sara C. Galvan, Gone Too Far: Measure 37 and the Perils of OverRegulating Land Use, 23 YALE L. & POL. REV. 587 (2005); The Oregonian, June 12, 2005,
Metro/Northwest A1.
35
Kelo, 125 S.Ct., at 2671, 2677 (O’Connor, J. dissenting, characterizing the result as “perverse”).
36
Id., at 2675 (characterizing the majority opinion).
37
Gibeaut, supra note 33, at 46.
33
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for private ownership.38

Those groups are presently seeking to energize both

Congressional and Statelegislative action to recalibrate the property rights scales, or as
they would more likely describe it to fix the egregious existing error.39

The Oregon initiative’s, Measure 37, reversal of supporters and dissenters provides a nice
second bookend on the Takings debate.

Generally stated, the initiative establishes that

any governmental action which reduces the value of privately held property, including
regulatory limitations imposed on use, requires compensation.40

When that initiative

was temporarily overturned by the trial court on various state and federal constitutional
grounds41 some individuals were so offended that they initiated a recall effort against the
judge.42 The recall supporters summed up their complaint as follows: “[The judge] has
undercut the fundamental, God-given right of Oregonians to truly own their property.”43
Although many Oregonians undoubtedly would temper that articulation, there can be
little doubt that at least a majority of the voters (who passed similar initiatives twice44)
believe that private property interests are close to, if not are, sole and despotic absolutes.
The voices in opposition have pointed with equal concern and passion to the initiative’s

38

See Lasden, supra note 33, at 30; New York Times, supra note 32.
See Lasden, supra note 33, at 30; The Oregonian, supra note 34, at A8.
40
See Macpherson v. Dept. of Administrative Services, xx P.3d xx, 2006 WL 433953 (Or. 2006)
(finding the Measure constitutional and reversing the trial court’s decision invaliding the statute); The
Oregonian, Jan. 11, 2006, Front Page.
41
See General Judgment and Order dated October 24, 2005, filed in Marion County Circuit Court, Mary
Mertens James, Judge.
42
See The Oregonian, Dec. 4, 2005, Metro/Northwest at B4. The petition was subsequently dropped based
on technical issues (missing petition numbers). See The Oregonian Jan. 12, 2006 online at:
http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/index.ssf?/base/news/113703632525250.xml&coll=7
43
Id.
44
A previous initiative, Measure 7, was passed in the November 2000 General Election and subsequently
overturned on technical grounds (failure to vote separately on its multiple changes to the Oregon
Constitution) by the Oregon Supreme Court in 2002 in League of Oregon Cities et al. v. State of Oregon,
334 Or. 645, 56 P.3d 892. Measure 37 passed with 61 percent of the vote, carrying all but one Oregon
county. See The Oregonian, Jan. 9, 2006, Metro at B1.
39
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adverse effect on Oregon’s long history of land use planning, arguing that private real
property rights must reflect not only individual but public interests.45

Intellectual property law has taken property beyond its historical roots in the tangible.
No longer confined to dirt and other things we literally hold dear, legions of academics
through many hundreds of articles now fervently debate the appropriateness of property
rights in ideas and their expression.46 From the fine arts to the technological the burning
issue is whether increasing “propertization” reflects an improved understanding of
appropriate (and even just) levels of individual ownership or the building of Blackstonian
castles run amok. Examples can be found across the full gamut of intellectual property
regimes. Patent law’s subject matter continues to expand – now encompassing business
methods47 and the “stuff of life”48 – thus putting greater areas of the formerly public
domain behind private fences.

Proponents, depending on their normative persuasions,

laud the related encouragement of innovation49 or the recognition of the inventors’
rights.50

Opponents agonize over the efficiency consequences such as impairment of

45

See id; The Oregonian, Jan. 11, 2006, Front page..
For a partial but impressive listing of those defined by Professor Mark Lemley as for and against see
Lemley, supra note 26, at 1035 n. 8. There are many others but I would specifically add Professor Glynn
Lunney’s early identification of the issue. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367 (1999)
47
See State Street Bank & Trust v. Signature Financial Group, 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (widely
interpreted as authorizing patents on business methods). See also Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper
Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get There, 7 MICH.
TELE. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 298-314 (2000-2001) (hereafter “Chiappetta Internet”) (discussing the case
and related articles).
48
See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA
Sequences, 49 EMORY L. J. 783 (2000) and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patenting the Human Genome, 39
EMORY L. J. 721 (1990).
49
See Chiappetta Internet, supra note 47, at 306-307 (discussing the market public goods justification for
United States patent law).
50
The position may reflect, among other justifications, a Lockean labor view or a Hegelian personhood
approach. See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
46
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future innovation and the effects of trolls, thickets and mandatory injunctions51 on
efficient exploitation.52

Trademark law expansion is praised by some as avoiding

incipient confusion53 and limiting free rides on another’s creativity or investment54 while
being simultaneously denounced by others as a clog on competition55 and a muzzle on
free-speech.56 The public epicenter, however, lies in copyright law. The rise and fall of
Napster and its peer-to-peer progeny57 have not only garnered considerable attention in
the general press but become a topic of water-cooler conversation.

Many members of

the public have formed strong individual opinions, frequently based on direct personal
experience,58 about whether music down-loaders are digital age Robin Hoods doing
heroic battle against corporate greed or scurrilous naves undermining society.

Other

disputes over where the copyright ownership lines should be drawn includes the justice
(or not) of the 20 year extension of the term;59 the fairness (or not) of technology

51

See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC, 401 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert granted, 1
26 S.Ct. 733
(2005). The issue was recently very much in the general public eye as a result of the Blackberry case. See,
e.g., Roy Mark, RIM and NPT both Win in Settlement, Internetnews.com (March 6, 2006) at
http://www.internetnews.com/wireless/article.php/3589506.
52
See, e.g., Perception Issue Hindering Efforts to Improve Patent System Dudas Says, 71 BNA PATENT,
COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK J. 374 (Feb. 10 2006) (briefly outlining the issue and reporting on Patent
Commissioner Dudas’ argument that the problem is overblown).
53
Specifically, in the form of anti-dilution remedies. See, e.g., The Federal Trademark Dilution Act, Pub.
L. No. 104-198, 109 Stat. 985 (codified at 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1125(c), 1127 (2000)). For a general discussion
of the issues see Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: More than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J. OF LAW,
TECH. AND POL. 35, 71-74. (2003) (hereafter “Chiappetta Trademarks”).
54
See generally, id. (arguing for expanding the justifications for trademark law to include carefully
calibrated “incentives” to invest in their creation).
55
See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet,
41 HOUS. L. REV. 777 (2004).
56
See, e.g., Chiappetta Trademarks, supra note 53, at 78-83.
57
See, e.g., Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 359-360
(2005); James Gibson, Once and Future Copyright, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167 (2005).
58
See, e.g., Allen Bauer, RIAA Lawsuits Hit Close to Home, Oracle at Delphi Blog (Jan 24. 2006) at
http://blogs.borland.com/abauer/archive/2006/01/24/22891.aspx; RIAA Gives the Gift of Lawsuits,
MP3/MIDI Music Blog (Dec. 16, 2005) at http://mp3.about.com/b/a/227916.htm; How Not to Get Sued by
the RIAA for File-Sharing, Electronic Frontier Foundation at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/howtonotgetsued.php.
59
Discussed in detail infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
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protection mechanisms and anti-circumvention laws;60 and the Supreme Court’s recent
adjustment to the real or perceived Sony61 deference to innovation with the addition of
inducement-based secondary liability in MGM v. Grokster.62

Property’s role in public policy is not, however, limited to issues traditionally articulated
as ownership questions. The regime has become an increasingly significant presence in
debates previously framed in distinctly different terms; in particular those involving
personal autonomy, privacy and other forms of rights analysis.

Takings jurisprudence

has moved well beyond realty to treat government entitlements as owned rather than
matters of individual right.63

Human organs and DNA hardly have long traditions as

personalty; however, as technology has made them exploitable resources there has been a
notable shift to property as the basis for related legal claims.64

Similarly, cyberspace

disputes over domain names,65 consumer profiling, unwanted email,66 scanning a website
for information or the planting of spyware67 find plaintiffs eagerly assuming the mantel
of property-owner complaining of a trespass rather than objecting to personal references
or observations against their will.
60

See. e.g., R. Polk Wagner, The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 74 Fordham L.
Rev. 243 (2005).
61
Sony Corporation of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
62
125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005).
63
See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964).
64
See, e.g., the (in)famous spleen case, Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.
1990)). See Penner, supra note 22, at 718-723 (discussing the court’s efforts to deal with the property
assertion ); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain, 66SPG LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 37-38 (2003) (discussing the enclosure through propertization of the
human genome). See also, Robin Cooper Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1
(2005) (discussing patenting of genetic inventions and how their nature conflicts with the rules for
mechanical products).
65
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 9 (discussing application of the property paradigm in cyberspace,
particularly to domain names).
66
See, e.g., Intel Corporation v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342, 71 P.3d 296, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32 (2003).
67
See, e.g., Kerrins v. Intermix Media Inc., xx F.Supp.3d __ (C.D. Cal. 2006); Sotelo v. Direct Revenue
LLC, 384 F.Supp.2d 1219 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
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Even a wide variety of current public policy issues explicitly articulated as not about
property turn on property considerations.

Campaign finance law, real-property-free

speech conflicts and the inheritance tax debate are three examples.

Campaign finance

reform restrictions are generally treated as raising 1st Amendment concerns.68 That
positioning obviously implicates property, requiring the courts to determine whether the
owner’s right to use their property (in this case the great proxy money) can be
constitutionally limited.

However, on closer examination property’s involvement goes

well beyond being affected by the 1st Amendment outcome; it determines whether a 1st
Amendment issue exists.

Rather than starting from the unexamined assumption that

property involves unfettered rights to use we could instead view property as being built
up purposefully from zero.

From that starting point the initial question is not the

permissibility of interference but whether a conflicting right exists at all. If it does not,
the 1st Amendment concern never arises.

The same analysis applies to whether speech can be prevented when the desired forum
involves someone else’s realty.69

The traditional positioning pits the owner’s property

right to exclude against the speaker’s 1st Amendment rights.

However, that conflict

only exists because we assume that property ownership includes the right to prevent third
parties from using an owned resource to speak their minds.

If it does not, there is no

conflict and no free speech concern.

68

Cf., McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (treating restrictions on campaign
contributions as a 1st Amendment issue).
69
Cf., Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. National Labor Relations
Board, 444 U.S. 507 (1976).
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The inheritance tax is generally described as about fairness.70

Proponents point to

destruction of personal legacy71 and the related evocation of lost family farms and
destroyed small businesses72 while opponents focus on the rich versus the poor (the tax
acting as a Reverse Robin Hood73 or embodying a moral obligation to “give back” based
on success74) and the social-political concerns arising from increasingly concentrated
wealth.75

These fairness arguments, both against and for the tax, however, all assume

that directing assignment on death is an integral part of property ownership. As a result
taxation (inheritance or otherwise76) is treated as taking something away and therefore
requiring justification, including on fairness grounds.

President Bush reflected that

position by stating in the 2000 election campaign that the tax surplus should be given
back to the taxpayers because “it’s the people’s money.”77

If, however, property

ownership does not include the right to direct assignment on death, then neither the
decedent nor the heirs have any claim in the first instance. Not only does the discussion

70

See, e.g., Tax Policy Blog at http://www.taxfoundation.org/blog/show/991.html;
Id.
72
See, e.g., House Passes Estate Tax Ban, USAToday, Managing Your Money (Apr. 13, 2005) at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2005-04-13-estatetax_x.htm;
http://www.deathtax.com/deathtax/efcfamily.html.
73
See House Passes Permanent Estate Tax Repeal, Washington Post, April 14, 2005 p. A4 at:
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2005-04-13-estatetax_x.htm (quoting House Minority Leader
Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.)).
74
See Forum on Estate Tax (statements of William Gates, Sr.) at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/template.cfm?PubID=900584
75
Alexis De Tocqueville’s predicted that inheritance taxation would rise in importance as the issue became
the inheritability of a market economy’s new aristocratic titles - those of accumulated wealth. See Alexis
De Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, xx (Chicago Press, Translated by Harvey C. Mansfield and
Delba Winthrop 2000).
76
Cf. James Penner, Misled by “Property”, CANADIAN J. OF L. AND JURISPRUDENCE, 75 (2005) (noting that
the property question pervades tax issues).
77
See Bush and Gore Return to Campaign Trail, CNN.com (Mar. 23, 2000) at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/stories/03/23/campaign.wrap/ ("The surplus isn't the
government's money, it's the people's money. When I become president, I'm going to say, 'Let's send some
of it back to the people paying the bills. Let's let people keep more and more of their money.’” ).
71
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of whether the tax-taking is fair disappear but the “zero up” view makes the issue
whether anythingshould be inherited at all.

PART II: Property Functionally Defined

The above abbreviated review reveals that although property pervades United States
public policy discussion, those debates contain a surprisingly simple common theme.
Each involves disputes regarding “ownership” of a resource (land, intellectual product,
body part, personal information, website server or money).

Equating property with

ownership does not, of course, resolve the definitional question. It merely shifts the
problem to determining what it means for someone to own something in the property
sense.

One possibility lies in our instincts which offer a straight-forward ownership
proposition.78

Although characterized in a variety of ways, the intuitive gist that

ownership means “it’s mine (and not yours)” is not far off the substantive mark.79 Close
may be good enough when stiff competition for the resource does not exist, but as the
examples in Part I reveal it no longer suffices.

So, although those intuitions serve as a

useful starting point we must develop a more precise definition to guide society’s
increasing important and complex property-ownership debates.
78

The article generally assumes a Western and, specifically, United States, normative framework. Quite
clearly instincts vary and what is said in the text hardly applies universally. See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta,
The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few
Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INTER. L. 333, 375-381 (2000) (hereafter “Chiappetta WTO”)(noting the wide
variety of normative views regarding intellectual property justifications); infra note xx.
79
A large number of commentators have articulated this point albeit in a variety of ways. See, e.g.,
Lemley, supra note 26, at 1037.
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Before turning to that task, one point should be explicitly put on the table to avoid
distraction.

A few scholars have argued that the same intuitions about property I am

using as the point of entry into the definitional venture create such strong popular
preconceptions that they must unavoidably capture and distort debate.80 Certainly when
a widely-held view conflicts with a proposal it must be addressed.

I believe their

concern substantially overstates the situation and to the extent problems exist they can
and should be overcome. However, to make that argument requires first laying out why
the functional approach most appropriately defines property.

Indulgence is requested

until Subpart B below.

A.

The Functional Definition of Property.

Blackstonian articulation of “sole and

despotic dominion”81 more or less equates to the strongest version of the intuitive “it’s
mine” and thus offers a good initial definitional candidate.

Although appealing in its

simplicity (which in part explains its intuitive appeal), it can be quickly dismissed as an
unsuitable framework for public policy debate. If sole and despotic dominion properly
defines property then there are no intermediate possibilities - either one is or one is not an
owner.82

The all-or-nothing positioning makes property a conflict between those

advocating rights and those resisting them, giving the related debates the appearance of
epic battles between right and wrong, good and evil.83 That framing may be appealing as
80

See generally, id.
See supra note xx for Professor Rose’s debunking of the Blackstonian mythology.
82
See Yu, supra note 9, at 6, 9-11 (characterizing the result in intellectual property as creating a “bipolar”
debate between maximalists and minimalists while ignoring the vast array of possibilities in between).
83
Id., at 10-11. Both the positioning and the resulting polarizing effects obscure possible solutions. Not
only is calling one’s opponents names hardly conducive to cooperative enterprise, either in seeking or
accepting alternatives, but it can also lead to the name caller’s own rigidity.
81
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a tactical matter (although the actual effects are more frequentlycounter -productive) and
it certainly can be good rhetorical fun.

However, such an obvious mischaracterization

cannot be seriously defended on the merits.84

The arguments and outcomes discussed in

Part I make it readily apparent that property ownership is not a binary proposition.85 Sole
and despotic dominion only represents one endpoint86 of an extremely rich continuum of
successively less absolute ownership possibilities eventually reaching the other terminus
of none. Adopting only the most extreme of the possible alternatives as the definition of
property unjustifiably narrows the scope of public policy debate. It is time to stop
maligning Blackstone87 and treat sole and despotic dominion as the straw-man it is.

Moving along the continuum to the extremely strong but nonetheless limited rights
reflecting real property ownership reveals that the above argument applies with equal
force to every definition which casts property in pre-established and immutable terms.
Every such effort suffers from the same fatal flaw: it confuses a possible outcome with
the regime itself.

88

Specifically, realty law only represents society’s present

84

The distortion is so great one has to suspect that even most advocates of sole and despotic dominion
would be shocked (and likely appalled) to discover the position had somehow carried the day and
henceforth governed every property decision. As Professor Yu cogently points out, its practical
desirability varies considerably depending on the specific circumstances. See id., at 9. In fact, not even
Blackstone was on board. See Rose, supra note 2, at 631-632 (explaining Blackstone intended his
“definition” as a cartoon caricature or trope, not a literal definition). The response to the argument that
those holding conflicting views are simply “wrong” is dealt with infra in Part III.
85
The highly nuanced rules of intellectual property law provide a good example, although as Professors
Carrier any Yu forcefully demonstrate even real property law is far from absolute. See generally, Carrier,
supra note 9 and Yu, supra note 9, at 6.
86
Moreover, a little reflection reveals there are no real-world examples of that mythical beast actually
walking among us, so it is likely only a theoretical endpoint. See supra not 85 discussing real property law,
the most likely candidate.
87
See Rose, supra 21, at 632.
88
In effect confusing a specific manifestation with the underlying conceptual essence. Cf. Plato, THE
REPUBLIC, 187-189 (Hackett, Translated by G.M.A. Grube, Revised C.D.C. Reeve 1992)(those in the cave
mistaking the reflection for the underlying truth); Rawls, supra note 15, at 5 (“The concept of justice as
distinct from the various conceptions of justice”); Van Doren, supra note 7, at 30-32 (discussing the Greek
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determination regarding the ownership of land.

As the examples in Part I again

demonstrate those rules do not reflect even the many other existing (to say nothing of
possible) forms of resource ownership.
response to new circumstances.89

Moreover, real property itself changes in

Therefore, a property question certainly is whether to

apply a particular set of ownership rules, but that is not the property question. A useful
definition must permit spirited discussion of the full range of ownership possibilities,
including existing paradigms, modifications and entirely new creations.

Any fixed

definition willfully ignores the “action” and has little, if anything, to recommend it as a
framework for public policy debate.

Almost a century ago Professor Wesley Hohfled proposed an alternative definitional
approach90 based on extremely flexible method of conceptualization ownership. By
defining property as a cluster of attributes his system not only acknowledges but expects
enormously varied ownership arrangements, each to be defined by constructing a related
“bundles of sticks.”

Professor Hohfled’s model certainly improves ownership discourse

compared to the limited and unproductive “yes – no” formulation of fixed
characterizations.

However, it still fails to provide a useful public policy analytical

framework. Professors Menell and Dwyer aptly capture the gist of the problem.

The

Hohfeldian approach to property lacks a “central organizing theme” which unifies “the
philosopher/scientist’s quest to differentiate between changeable characteristics (implementations) and
underlying essence).
89
The original “ad coelum” rule in realty was forced to give way in face of the development of air travel.
See U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“[The] doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is
a public highway, as Congress has declared. Were that not true, every transcontinental flight would subject
the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To recognize such private
claims to the airspace would clog these highways, seriously interfere with their control and development in
the public interest, and transfer into private ownership that to which only the public has a just claim.”). See
also, Parisi, supra, note 9 (tying changes in property law to changes in the economic model).
90
See supra note 22 (Professor Hohfeld’s work dates from between 1915-1925).

Property – Chiappetta

Page 18

many elements of the field in a deep and intuitive way.”91

The same intricate

definitional web which captures the richness of possible outcomes provides no straightforward synthesizing conceptualization for understanding the genesis and purpose of
those outcomes.92

So, although application of the model’s highly refined analytical

framework can describe a myriad of property results with awesome precision, the lack of
a common connective theme leaves public policy debate regarding how and why we
might select among them incoherent.93

The related confusion has to lead some to ask,

quite reasonably, whether the property concept serves any useful role in public policy
discourse.94

That vital missing piece in the definitional puzzle is put in place by combining A.M.
Honore’s insight that generalizing the Hohfeldian ownership attributes makes them more
useful in decision-making with Professors Menell and Dwyer’s “social governance of
resources” conceptualization of the regime as a whole. Honore distills and abbreviates
Hohfeld’s attribute list into a far more accessible and practically relevant list of
“incidents of ownership” which focus on describing how property actually affects the real
world (such as the right to possess, right to use, right to capital, power to alienate and the
right to exclude).95

Taking that generalizing approach a step further reveals that all of

Honore’s “incidents” can in turn be understood to implement a single practically relevant

91

See Menell and John P. Dwyer, supra note 28, at 600.
See Penner, supra note 22, at 714-175 and 768-798.
93
See id., at 770 and 777.
94
See Grey, supra note 6. See also, Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 533; John E. Cribbett, Property
Lost: Property Regained, 23 PAC. L.J. 93, 97-99; Penner, supra note 22, at 714-715; Adam Mossoff, What
is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 372 (2003) all of whom note the
problem, then propose solutions.
95
See A. M. Honore, OWNERSHIP, OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961). For a
helpful (but ultimately critical) examination of the full set of rights, see Penner, supra note 22, at 754-766.
92
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unifying theme.96 Taken as a whole Honore’s list of incidents define property as the
owner’s right to exercise some kind and degree of control97 over the subject matter in
question.

Although recognizing that control lies at the core of property considerably advances the
enterprise, it does not fully define the regime.

It does not explain what kind or how

much control must be present to label a group of attributes or incidents “property”
ownership. Nor does it identify the proper objects of property – that is what can be
owned.

These critical gaps can be filled through refining Professors Menell’s and

Dwyer’s characterization of property as a society’s decisions regarding the governance of
its resources.98

96

I agree with Professor Mossoff that property cannot be described by one particular incident but requires a
more expansive yet unified group of attributes. See Mossoff, supra note 84, at 376 (“the concept of
property is explained best as an integrated unity of the exclusive rights to acquisition, use and disposal
….”) and 418 (finding in the trade secret context “the essence of the concept of property consist[s] of the
fundamental possessory rights – the rights to acquire, use and dispose of things one has created through
one’s own efforts” – a discussion I naturally believe would have been significantly enhanced by
considering my earlier 1999 article on the subject which if nothing else proves not all twentieth century
commentators (albeit in my case by only one year – perhaps two depending on how one counts the
millennium) “seem to agree on one thing about trade secret law: it is not a doctrine of property” id., at 416).
I cannot, however, identify the essential single “common organizing theme” unifying the expanded list of
attributes in a “deep and intuitive way,” which is supplied by control. See supra note xx (defining
knowledge as the search for something’s essential unchanging aspect).
97
If the full scope of Hohfeld’s and Honore’s attributes and incidents is not considered “control” may
appear to involve only affirmative rights, not obligations. I have, therefore, explicitly called out
conditions and obligations as part of “kind and degree” in my later elaboration of the concept. See, e.g.
infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
98
See Menell and Dwyer, supra note 28, at 601-602. Their explicit focus on teaching Property Law leads
them quite appropriately to articulate their thesis in inter-society, institutional comparative terms. I
hopefully have not done them or their ideas injustice with my descriptions in the text. If I unwittingly put
false words in their mouths I apologize. I do not, however, recant my substantive position, whether or not
they agree.
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The flexible term resources appropriately reflects the constantly changing subject matter
of society’s ownership dialogue.99

Property is not limited to a pre-defined type of

resources (e.g., land, things, but not ideas). It concerns any resource which might be
usefully exploited and may, therefore, be disputed making determining ownership control
practically important.100

In pre-industrial society the agricultural and artisan nature of

the economy made the crucial (if not only) resource issue who controlled the land (hence
the strong historical associations between real property law and property as a whole) and,
to a lesser extent, productive personalty – work implements, seeds, cows, crops and the
like. However, as changes in social and economic activity give rise to conflicts over
other types of resources the scope of property must likewise change.101 Although we
may chose to label the various resource specific outcomes as individual species – real,

99

Id., at 601.
Theoretically in a “state of nature” with ample common obtaining needed resources for immediate
personal use only involves “harvesting” what has not already been claimed. See Locke, supra note 3, at
Sec. 33, 36 and 37. Consequently, property is only required when there no longer is “still enough, and as
good left.” Id. That idyllic picture, however, changed with gradual individual accumulations and the
invention of commerce, and most particularly the preservative power of money. Id., at 36 and 45-50. See
also, Bethany Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold Story of Pierson v. Post, (xx –SSRN working
paper) (arguing that the case was in part about the conflict been agricultural traditions and new commercial
wealth over governance of common resources); Neal Stephenson, CONFUSION 650 (Harper 2004)
(discussing the economic shift from land to commerce). It may also not adequately take into account other
human characteristics which may generate conflict for reasons other than need (desire to assert power or
superiority, greed). In all events, it is only when more than one individual stakes a claim that the question
of who controls the resource comes into play. See, e.g. Rose, supra note 21, at 632.
101
See Menell and Dwyer, supra note 28, at 601-602; Reich, supra note 63 (commercially valuable
government entitlements as property). Cf. Penner, supra note 22, at 717-719 (noting the point in his
commentary on International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) but disagreeing with
the Court’s apparent willingness to treat property as “a particular legal device that protects the owner’s
relation to something of value … and as such may in principle be applied to anything whatsoever”). See
also Tocqueville, supra note 74, at 3-6 (noting the transition from the importance of land to other forms of
commercial wealth); Marx and Engels, supra note 1, at xx (focus on all “means of production”).
100
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personal, intellectual and otherwise – they remain part of a single control genus102 which
operates without constraint on the kinds of resources to which it applies.103

Second, the Professors’ focus on a society’s decisions focuses on choice among the full
range of governance alternatives (everything, a lot, some, a little, to none).

Doing so

helpfully clarifies that property involves determinations that some ownership-control
should be granted, not a specific kind or degree nor because the decision is based on a
particular justification.104 All of the difficult and unproductive efforts to identify the
“core” elements of property or tie the regime to accomplishment of a particular objective
can and should be abandoned. It is sufficient for an interest to be property that it assign
some right of control over the resource to some owner regardless of why, in whom
(individual, entity, groups or government), its kind (some or all of possession, use,
exclusion, transfer, etc) or its degree (absolute or subject to limitations, requirements
and/or affirmative obligations).

Despite these substantial virtues, the Professors use of governance decisions casts the
property net too broadly, implicating every action or circumstance resulting in allocation
of control. As they properly point out, a myriad of factors influence (and are influenced
102

Not unlike Plato’s classification schema for appetites and knowledge, property has an essence plus
“particular sorts.” See Plato, supra note 88, at 113-114. See also, supra note xx.
103
The Lockean and Marxist focus on labor raises the interesting and important question of whether labor
constitutes a resource governable by property law. See supra notes xx and yy and accompanying text.
Defining property functionally rather than normatively provides a clearly affirmative response albeit that
propertizing labor means granting control over its source, meaning human-beings. The result reinforces
the crucial point that the functional approach clearly separates identifying the possibility of control from its
normative desirability. By doing so it clarifies that it is not the abstract concept of property which
generates the result, but society’s values whatever their source which control. The approach also allows us
to treat life and liberty interests as subjects of property if we so desire. See supra notes xx and yy (Locke’s
and others inclusion of rights in property).
104
See Menell and Dwyer, supra note 28, at 601-603.
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by), help understand and affect property.105

For example, contract law governs

agreements which create or resolve control over resources. Non-binding social norms of
behavior powerfully affect an owner’s actual use of a resource (fast-food restaurants do
not mix well with rendering plants regardless of the zoning; it’s a good idea to ask the
neighbors before building a fence even on one’s own side of the property line).
Although their point is well taken and certainly essential to fully understanding the
regime’s implementation ,106 such an expansive view risks making property everything
thereby turning it into nothing.107

The solution lies in holding true to the practical objective – helpfully framing the issues
in public policy debate regarding control over society’s resources.108

Accomplishing

that goal calls for distinguishing between the myriad inputs, influences and interactions
affecting those decisions and the decisions themselves. The central function of property,
and therefore the focus of the related debate, is determining which member(s) of society
ultimately prevail in contests over social resources when all other avenues fail.

That

points the definition toward property law – again approached from the practical rather
than the metaphysical, so meaning those rights and obligations enforced by the official

105

Menell and Dwyer, supra note 28, at 606 (explaining that one leg of their triadic relation includes a wide
range of governing institutions including “social, background legal (default rules), market (contract), and
political (legislation or administrative control, meaning zoning)” which all control the resource.
106
This is particularly important for law professionals charged with its implementation, thus clearly
supporting their argument for covering these matters in a property law course. The specific question I raise
is whether they “are” property” or, as I argue, merely part of the environment in which property exists.
107
See Penner, supra note 22, 722-723.
108
See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (establishing the practical focus of this definitional
inquiry).
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machinery of the state.109

That limitation does not prevent other considerations from

influencing the creation or implementation of the legal rules. Influences such as informal
social norms may lead us to decide the content of a rule, that no rule is required, that a
rule is inapplicable to particular circumstances or that an informal accommodation is
preferable to enforcement.

However, as the rules which have the final say over who

wins serve as the crucial central theme of our public policy debates over property, those
rules should also constrain the definition. 110

Limiting property to law still leaves open the question of which law qualifies. As so far
defined, property consists of society’s decisions regarding who ultimately wins against all
others in resource-control conflicts.

The distinguishing characteristics of property law

therefore are its resource-control focus and the classic, albeit somewhat confusing, “in
rem” view that the related rights and obligations are valid and binding “against the
world.” Once again although the general is close to the mark precision requires a more
circumspect articulation.

Rather than literally good “against the world” property law

resource-control rights and obligations apply on their terms to all members of society
merely because they are members of society, not because a special relationship exists
between the particular disputants (the membership trigger is referred to as “status-based”
below).111

In short, although property law involves control over a resource, that is not

sufficient. The ability to exercise that control must also be status-based.
109

Professors Menell and Dwyer do explicitly note the “background legal (default rules)” component of
property. See Menell and Dwyer, supra note 28, at 606. I believe, however, given the purpose of property,
those rules forms the core for purposes of public policy debate.
110
See Rose, supra note 9, at 994 (“in their most general form, property rights identify which person’s
claims count against which resources ….”).
111
See, e.g., Chander, supra note 9, at 774 (identifying against whom the right can be asserted as a key
characteristic of a property right); Robert P. Merges, Essay: A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20
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Applying the test to a contract for the purchase of realty demonstrates the crucial
distinction between laws which affect, operate on or influence property and property law
itself. 112 Contract law only governs the rights and obligations between the owner and the
buyer as well as those claiming based on a relationship with one of those parties (e.g.,
assignees, third party beneficiaries).

Although contract law involves control over a

resource (the land), it does not satisfy the status-based requirement and, therefore, is not
property law.113 In contrast, the rules defining the seller’s rights prior to closing and the

Berkeley Tech. L. J. 1477, 1495-1496 (2005). As property rights can vary in kind and degree, it is entirely
possible that a property right may actually affect only some third party “strangers” rather than all members
of society. For example, property rights might not affect a bona fide purchaser for value or a duty may
only be owed to specific kinds of “trespassers.” Additionally, in a legally divided world legal jurisdiction
generally extends only to members of the society and, in some instances, those present in or making claims
regarding resources located within that society. The functional approach also clarifies the confusion as to
whether property is merely relational as between parties or defines rights “in something.” As property is
only relevant when needed to resolve contested claims to resources it clearly defines the relationships
between the rival claimants with regard to the thing. Cf. Marx and Engels, supra note 1, at 168-169
(discussing the evolution from person-to-resource relationships when conflict is absent to person-to-person
when disputes arose and noting that in the former there was no need for property); supra note xx.
However, because that relationship is triggered only because of competing claims to a specific resource it is
reasonable to consider property as abstractly attached to (or in) the resource itself.
112
Most analyses will be as straight-forward as that following in the text, turning on the dual requirements
of (i) status-based (ii) control over a resource. That formulation will, however, require some adjustments
in existing standard legal taxonomies. For example, “contract law” applied to agreements creating
property rights, such as contracts for easements, rental agreements for a term of years or licenses of
intellectual property assets must be bifurcated. The rules governing the relationship between the parties
under the agreement (for example, an action to effect creation of the right) are not property law whereas
any rules defining the related rights of control applicable to all based on their membership in society (for
example, what and when the resulting rights in the asset – easement, licensed right to use can be assigned,
who can hold them and whether the easement holder, renter or licensee can bring a claim for invasion of
their resulting interest) are. Or, regarding torts those rules regulating negligent injury or battery to persons
are not property law whereas actions such as trespass are. Takings law raises a particularly interesting
question. On one hand it defines what constitute relevant property interests. On the other those rights only
technically operate between the specific (the government and the individual whose property is being taken)
Whatever the technical outcome (which turns on whether the government is a “party” or “all members of
society), I would treat it as property law (undoubtedly to the disappointment of Constitutional scholars) on
the practical basis that the related debates would profit significantly from the functional resource-control
framework. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (discussing how Takings law issues would be
analyzed).
113
Disputes over “ownership” of the contract rights themselves involve a resource control contest thus
satisfying the first requirement but would only implicate property law if the claim is also status-based. A
contract law based ownership claim (as opposed to a right to assign, see supra note xx) involving parties
having no relationship to each other, the original parties or the underlying transaction is hard to envision
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buyer’s rights after closing to control the land against each other and other members of
society114 even though they are strangers to the transaction is property law.115

The now complete functional definition can be summarized as follows: Property consists
of society’s decisions granting state enforced, status-based control (including rights,
duties and obligations but regardless of their kind and degree) over its resources
(regardless of their nature). Applying the definition to the examples outlined in Part I
demonstrates how conceptualizing property functionally rather than in terms of a specific
set of rights, specific resources and/or predefined goals significantly improves our
understanding of the essential issue in public policy debate, thus advancing the practical
objectives of this exercise.

Regarding government Takings the functional approach replaces the amorphous inquiry
into whether the claimant holds a property right and, if so, whether it was taken, with a
straight-forward analytical framework.

The “existence” question is resolved by

determining whether the claimant holds any legally enforceable status-based right of
control over the resource in question (regardless of the nature of the resource). If so, a
property right exists and we then determine how the challenged government action
affects that control. If control has been diminished, in whole or in part, property has been
taken.

This simplified analysis reveals why quick and easy Takings answers are so

difficult to come by. The issue is rarely, if ever, whether Takings claimants have a
(suggestions are welcome). Consequently, the property claims would generally, if not exclusively, arise
under other legal regimes (for example, fraud or tortious interference).
114
The “rights” need not be absolute but may vary in kind and degree. See supra note xx.
115
See generally, Merges, supra note 111, for an interesting discussion of the relationship between contract
and property law.
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property interest in the resource; they invariably do.116

The disagreement is over their

appropriate kind and degree. What drives that disagreement (and explains why situations
like Kelo and Measure 37117 generate such passion) is not incorrect technical
determination of existing control rights but persistent disagreement over what those rights
should be.118

That understanding substantially clarifies the path to productive discourse.

Existing conflicts over resources must of course be decided by reference to what is and
many words are (and should be) lavished on the conformity (or not) of those particular
outcomes with current law. However, those expert debates and determinations should be
viewed as essentially procedural with respect to public policy debate – identifying which
members of society properly bear the burden of seeking change.119

They contribute

nothing substantive to,120 and may affirmatively impair, public policy discussion because
they do not address the actual issue and proper focus of debate – dealing with the effects
of our conflicting views of the normative “right.”121 Consequently, productive Takings

116

Because the V and XIV Amendment issue is defined in terms of “property” its application is extremely
far-reaching under the functional resource-control approach. Whether that outcome reflects the “original
intent” can be left to Constitutional law scholars and Supreme Court Justices. Whatever that outcome,
Takings law public policy debate stands to benefit from the functional framework for the reasons described
in the text.
117
See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
118
The use of “existing-should” clearly trigger David Hume and the “is-ought” relationship. However, he
and it are better discussed later in connection with the underlying normative differences. See infra notes
xx
- yy and accompanying text.
119
We do not always get the technical interpretation correct making such debates do have important
consequences and related value. However, rectifying those errors only identifies the happy and the
unhappy under the status quo. It does nothing to resolve the normative differences which cause the
disagreement dividing us into happy and unhappy.
120
If a firm goal is in place implementation is largely a technical exercise and could be resolved by expert
debate and determination; an impressively developed skill in most industrialized nations. See infra notes
xx
- yy and accompanying text (discussing the relatively straight-forward process of legal implementation
absent normative disagreement).
121
Cf. Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society & Regulatory Takings: Castles, Investments & Just
Obligations, xx HARV. ENVTL. L. R. __ (2006) (discussing how different views of ownership affect the
analysis in Takings law).
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debate requires avoiding entanglement with distracting disputes over what the law is122
and focusing directly on our varying opinions regarding what it should be. The details of
how the functional approach to property helps society address that issue are taken up in
Part III below.

Applying the functional approach to the remaining examples produces the same
clarification and understanding:

that normative conflict, not interpretation or

implementation of existing rights, lays at the core of our property debates.

The

intellectual property debate generally does not concern whether the grant any control over
intangible and nonrivalrous resources is appropriate.

Like the Takings debate, the

disagreement arises from differences regarding the appropriate kind and degree.

And

like that debate that disagreement stems from our conflicting views of the “right,” not
intellectual property law’s failure to conform to a commonly agreed goal.

The debates over property rights in human organs, personal information, a website, or
money (as well as the extreme intellectual property position that “information wants to be
free”123) confirm the consistently normative source of our property problems.

In these

instances the debate starts earlier in the functional progression – that is, whether any
property rights should be granted.

That baseline decision does not escape normative

conflict; the difficulty being that some normative views support while others reject

122

In public policy debate existing law should only be viewed as a temporary acquiescence open to
revisitation and revision, not a final absolute determination. See infra notes xx-yy.
123
John Perry Barlow who has gotten good mileage out of this quote. See his The Economy of Ideas, 2.03
Wired 84 (Mar. 1994). It is not, however, entirely theoretical. For example that argument that business
methods or DNA related discoveries should be excluded from patent law could be viewed as “no rights”
positions. See supra notes xx and yy.
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allocating individual control over the resource.124

Ironically, that normative issue may

be more easily resolved, as many otherwise conflicting value positions will all support
granting some property rights. Beyond that agreement, however, the divergent reasons
favoring the grant will leave us to confront the resulting and unavoidable conflicts over
kind and degree.

The case for the functional approach completed, it is time to return to the deferred issue
of whether it can be successfully implemented despite the contrary popular view that
property means “its mine.” Following that discussion, found in Subpart B immediately
below, the remaining issue – how the functional framework helps us understand the
effects of our normative differences on public policy debate– is taken up in Part III.

B. The “Conversational” Property Problem.

When used in its conversational125 sense

the word “property” undeniably connotes rights lying far toward, if not at, the sole and
despotic dominion end of the control spectrum. Others have extensively chronicled such
usage, including by academics, lawyers and judges126

Calabresi and Melamed’s off-

cited use of “property rules” to describe injunctive remedies entitling a resource owner

124

At this level it is easy to see why “whether” debates are articulated in terms of the evils of property law.
Rejection of an opponent’s normative position in favor of granting control is a rejection of propertization.
That does not, however, make property evil or wrong; it merely reflects normative disagreement over
whether its use under the circumstances is appropriate. The functional approach helps clarify by
identifying the issue arises from the parties’ differences, not property law itself.
125
See Stephen L. Carter, Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
715 (1993) (aptly defining the common usage and understanding of “its mine” as “conversational
property”). Professor Rose uses the term “conventional” property which offers an attractive alternative,
although she appears to intend that term to cover richer views than the more extreme form discussed in the
text. See Rose, supra note 9, at 993.
126
The concern is particularly prevalent these days in intellectual property. The most recent offering is
from Professor Lemley, supra note 26. See also, Carrier, supra note 9; Yu, supra note 9, at 4-5 (discussing
the issue and referencing both Professor Lemley and Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The
Tenuous Connection Between Land and Copyright, 83 Wash. U. L. Q. 417 (2005)).
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unilaterally to prevent use by others127 provides an especially powerful example. Their
label clearly implies (if not asserts) that extremely strong, perhaps

even unlimited,

exclusionary rights constitute an essential and central characteristic of every property
interest. Some believe that our conversational predisposition leads us to adopt and accept
such mischaracterizations128 without examination thus distorting ownership discourse.129

The validity of the conversational property concern must be measured both by its
potential adverse substantive effects on public policy dialog and the likelihood those
effects will actually occur. The reason conversational capture causes substantive harm is
fully discussed in Subpart A and requires only brief recapitulation. A useful definition
must properly frame debate by acknowledging the existence of alternatives.

As the

conversational characterization only describes a single outcome,130 it inappropriately
limits debate (1) to considering whether virtually absolute rights should exist (property –
yes or no?) and (2) if (and whenever) “property” exists to determining whether an
interference or restriction can be convincingly justified. Consequently, if conversational
property captures the debate its serious mischaracterization of the issues would cause
significant substantive harm.

127

See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
128
The mischaracterization is generally an overstatement of degree, not merely asserting the existence of a
right to exclude. See Mossoff, supra note 84, at 377-378 (noting that although the right to exclude does not
define property, some right to exclude (broadly defined) constitutes an essential characteristic of property
albeit insufficient to define property as an integrated whole).
129
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1037.
130
The issue is stated in a variety of ways, generally that conversational property involves too strong a
claim of right, but they are all derivative of the fact that it rejects the rest of the possibilities. Interestingly,
even if no alternatives existed the conversational definition would still not be up to the framing task. Its
inherent ambiguity only indicates that a proponent or possessor of a property interest is entitled to “a lot.”
Public policy dialog requires something more precise.
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The key question, therefore, is whether using the term “property” unavoidably causes (or
permits) the conversational view to capture and control debate. Some commentators’ so
strongly believe that is the case, they have despaired of repair and instead seek solutions
(or, perhaps more accurately, solace) in mitigation.131 One such approach argues for
using a different label for debates regarding resource control questions not yet fully
captured, in particular those concerning intellectual “property.”132

Another accepts the

inevitability of at least some conversational propertization, even in intellectual property,
but seeks to limit the damage by emphasizing its qualified nature.133

To summarize my basic counter-argument, then elaborate:

I believe the inevitable

capture argument does not stand up under scrutiny.134 Participants in public dialog, both
its users and opponents, readily recognize conversational property rhetoric as advocacy
for one possible normative outcome among many. Those who agree with that outcome
adopt the rhetoric, those who do not rail against it.

Successful conversational

characterization, therefore, arises from normative agreement rather than the other way
around.

Moreover, even when circumstances risk capture through inappropriate proxy

131

See, .e.g., Carrier, supra note 9, at 5; Lemley, supra note 26, at 1032 and 1069-1075; Sterk, supra note
126, at 103.
132
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1075 (suggesting “IP”); Yu, supra note 9, at 5-6 (offering an
excellent survey of those efforts, but ultimately disagreeing with adopting a new label).
133
See generally, Carrier, supra note 9. Although couched in terms of reluctant “acceptance” (id., at 4) his
approach is at most a very short step from taking on the more general issue. I, therefore, suggest it may
actually serve as part of an incremental strategy for overall change rather than merely a mitigation of
unavoidable harm. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
134
That certainly does not mean the attempt is not made, frequently, as Alice discovered in speaking with
Humpty Dumpty, by usurping the role of definitional master in the hopes that the underlying premises
remain unexamined. See Lewis Carroll, ALICE IN WONDERLAND 268-269 (THE ANNOTATED ALICE
(Meridian 1960). Those holding “non-conversational” property views are hardly immune from the
attractions of characterization by label as evidenced by some of the suggested (perhaps tongue-in-cheek,
perhaps not) alternatives in the intellectual property context. See Yu, supra note 9, at 5 (noting the
suggestions of GOLEM and IMPS). Making the effort is not, however, the same as succeeding – Alice did
call Humpty into account by demanding an explanation. See Carroll, supra, at 269; infra notes xx-yy and
accompanying text.
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reliance, strong arguments exist that we should and can take on and eradicate the problem
rather than accepting it and limiting our efforts to mitigation.

Capture and distortion require some significant number of people exist who are or can be
misled into believing that conversational property accurately frames public policy debate.
The question is who might they be? The “are/can be misled” description is inapplicable
(as well as uncharitable) with regard to legal professionals (lawyers, judges, politicians
and academics), if not individually certainly as a group. Scholars are not bamboozled by
linguistic labels; they offer and demand detailed support before advocating or adopting
conversational property positions.135

Similarly, courts or legislatures articulating

outcomes in conversational property terms do so only after having first considered the
alternatives and determined that linguistic vehicle conveys their view of the proper
substantive outcome.136 Expert use of “property” in its conversational sense, therefore,
generally reflects knowing and intentional invocation of its connotations and
consequences, not the result of error arising from, or manipulation through, linguistic
mischaracterization.137

In those few instances when experts are led into error or

135

The eminent scholars Professor Lemley identifies as arguing that conversational property (or something
like it) ought to apply to intellectual property are certainly able to deal with linguistic nuance. See Lemley,
supra note 26, at 1035 n. 8. If that is their position (something on which I express no opinion here – he
clearly had significant difficulties determining my own clearly articulated non-conversational views;
compare id., at 1044 n. 55 with Chiappetta Trademarks, supra note 53, at 51), the use of the conversational
connotation does not reflect capture but the belief that on the merits the appropriate approach to intellectual
property law should be more “conversational” than those “lamenting the rise of property rhetoric.”
136
Contrast infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text discussing Congressional extension of copyright term
based on strongly held views supporting that outcome with Lemley, supra note 26, at 1041-1042.
Similarly, courts use conversational terminology (including the pursuit of free-riding) when judges believe
that is what existing law directs, hardly an outrageously activist view given the acknowledged legislative
expansion of intellectual property rights. Contrast Lemley, supra note 26, at 1042 (noting legislative
expansion to eliminate free-riding) with id., at 1042-44 (criticizing the courts for doing the same).
137
Bluntly put, when one expert’s property analysis is deemed astoundingly stupid by another it generally
reflects fundamental differences on the normative merits not that the first expert was demonstrably unable
to get past the conversational property connotations. The issue of conflicting normative views and their
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otherwise misuse conversational rhetoric other experts stand ready to identify and reject
the resulting faulty assumptions or conclusory analysis,138 as the robust intellectual
property debate amply demonstrates.139 Among experts improper vocabulary may be an
occasional inconvenience (and source of outrage), but no more.

The mischaracterization problem, therefore, must lie with non-experts. One possibility is
that their lack of training does not allow them to follow complex and technical public
policy discussion thus leaving them prone to error and prey to linguistic artifice. Many,
however, are aware of that possibility (experts as well as others140) and will give warning
and offer corrective criticism, commentary and alternatives.

Consequently, to be

effect on logical argument are discussed infra in Part III. Whether professional debate using
conversational property may inadvertently or intentionally confuse non-experts is discussed immediately
below in the text.
138
Experts, both the greats and the not-so-greats, do not always get it right. I can hardly disagree with
Professor Lemley on that score, having myself criticized what at least I perceived to be erroneous use of
conversational logic. See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A
Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 152-154(1999)
(hereafter “Chiappetta Trade Secrets”) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s trade secret property holding in
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002-1003 (1984) for inappropriately filling the gaps based on a
“walks like, talks like” conversational property analysis). However, the issue is not whether mistakes have
been (or will be) made, but the appropriate reaction. The relatively few actual errors (distinguished from
differences in normative views regarding the conversational outcome) hardly seem a matter of systemic
concern, particularly when they are so readily identified and challenged by other experts. Even if they
were a significant problem, as experts have the ability to deal with complexity it seems far more useful to
address the problem directly as part of an overall clarification of the analytical framework (such as
implementation of the functional approach) than to go after the problem indirectly via vocabulary. A
disingenuous expert is, of course, not making an error, but that distinction has no effect on other experts’
ability to identify and challenge the misuse. The issue of the effects of mistaken or intentional misuse on
non-experts, including specifically whether the existing vocabulary facilitates capture) follows in the text.
139
See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1035 n.6 (listing a long and influential list of scholars publicly and
eloquently criticizing the conversational property approach). Ironically, opponents of intellectual
“property” occasionally affirmatively contribute to the problem they allege exists by articulating their
concern as over “propertization.” See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 9, at 4; Lemley, supra note 26, at 1035.
That characterization sets up the very false choice between conversational property and no property they
are attacking, instead of addressing the actual differences regarding kind or degree. See Chiappetta
Trademarks, supra note 53, at 39. As most if not all professionals are fully aware others will call them to
account, one must suspect that in expert circles employing unadorned conversational property terminology
– either by proponents or dissenters - is more rhetorical flourish than substance.
140
Although experts are generally the first responders, they have no monopoly on the ability to identify
mischaracterization. A little distance from the expert flame frequently helps keep the heat from obscuring
the light.
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captured an individual must both fail to see the initial mischaracterization and be unable
to process subsequent warnings and information – making them very slow indeed.
Furthermore, for there to be any significant effect on public policy dialog that group must
be sufficiently large to influence debate on the merits.
hopeless individuals actually exists.

It is unlikely such a legion of

Each of us will vigorously affirm we are not

included in that number.141 At a minimum that reflects sufficient awareness to make
significant capture improbable. However, research supports our confidence, confirming
that the vast majority of individuals recognize the existence of choice and can avoid the
trap of simplifying mischaracterization.142

On property questions that means most

clearly understand that a range of control alternatives exist, that some foster their interests
while others do not and they should, therefore, both avoid making assumptions and
remain skeptical of another’s labeling143 (which, not incidentally, is not restricted to
conversational property advocates but other normative positions as well144). That means
they can identify conversational property as an option and perform such substantive
assessment as they deem appropriate to determine whether it corresponds to their own
views of the desirable outcome.145 If it does they will not only accept and support, but

141

My thanks to Professor Debra Ringold of the Atkinson School of Management at Willamette University
who made this cogent observation in our Business Lawyering course when discussing the fact that policymakers rush to protect the helpless “others” but rarely pause to consider who they might actually be.
142
Business scholarship regarding advertising demonstrates that advertisers cannot successfully mislead
individual decision-makers. See, e.g., John E. Calfee, FEAR OF PERSUASION (1997); Chiappetta
Trademarks, supra note 53, at 47. For similar reasons government propaganda efforts generally fail. See
Calfee, supra, at 6-7. For a recent example, if naming the statute authorizing various forms of government
inquiry into citizens’ behavior “The Patriot Act” was attempt to frame the debate it certainly failed to do so.
See, e.g., New York Times, Feb. 11, 2005, Editorial at A30
143
See Calfee, supra note 142, at 37-41.
144
See supra note xx (listing some of the equally non-neutral terms suggested by those seeking relatively
weak property rights in the intellectual property debate).
145
Clearly individual views of the “correct” outcome will frequently involve individual self-interest. That
does not make them illegitimate; it merely reflects the normative decision to place value on how one
individually fares. Those who disagree are no more demonstrably “right” for the same reasons discussed
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engage in, conversational property rhetoric. If not, they will resist it in favor of a
preferred alternative.

In short, substantive agreement triggers conversational rhetoric,

not vice versa.

Before addressing the more likely argument that circumstances cause individuals to
replace analysis they could perform with shortcut proxies leading to capture, one
profoundly troubling possibility should be noted. The above analysis demonstrates that
most members of society are highly unlikely to error because they believe or have been
misled into believing that conversational property accurately defines property ownership.
However, avoiding capture only requires the capacity to recognize choice and the ability
to select the outcome which reflects one’s preferences. It does not logically follow that
our preferences are not themselves seriously flawed. Viewed in that light, the widespread conscious adoption of conversational property norms may reflect a far more
serious system failure than linguistic capture. The conversational views lack of nuance
in face of obvious complexity and the related insouciance regarding predictable
consequences may indicate a fundamental inability to understand or assess objective
outcomes; in short lack of capacity to perform the necessary analytical tasks required bya
participatory decision-making system.146

If that is the case, the educational effects of

debate clearly will be insufficient. The only effective response would be adopting a

infra in Part III. See infra note xx (distinguishing corruption based on external quid pro quo returns to the
advocate).
146
Cf. De Tocqueville, supra note 74, at 61 (noting that for democracy to work “each individual is …
supposed to be as enlightened, as virtuous, as strong as any other of those like him”) and 155 (“one is
frightened, on the contrary, by the quantity of diverse knowledge and by the discernment that [the
Constitution of the United States] supposes in those whom it must rule” responding to the notion that
because “only simple conceptions take hold of the minds of the people” and, therefore, “a false idea, but
one clear and precise, will always have more power in the world than a true, but complex idea” permitting
capture by symbols and names).
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decision-making process which reduces, if not eliminates, participation by those
individuals – an extremely daunting, to say nothing of disturbingly elitist, prospect.147
Although the possibility cannot be dismissed out of hand,148 it makes proper framing of
public policy property debates (linguistically or otherwise) a distinctly secondary
problem.

Therefore, it can legitimately be assumed away for the purposes of this

endeavor’s far more modest objective.

Even if the majority has the capacity to avoid capture, it still may occur because
substantial numbers of people lack the time, energy or motivation to perform independent
analysis. As a result they will rely on short-cut proxies such as conversational property.
Its strong intuitive appeal makes it a particularly comfortable framework for abbreviated
decision-making regarding property questions, directly and especially when advocated by
trustworthy sources.149

The result is that those arguing for alternative views carry the

burden not only to overcome the conversational mischaracterization, but to convince the
proxy user to pay extra time and effort to pay attention to their argument. This does not
mean proxy outcomes will always be inconsistent with individual normative preferences,
but it certainly does substantially increase that possibility.

The proxy argument,

147
Cf. Plato, supra note 88, at 88-93 (412-414) (suggesting a ruling class of specially trained philosopherkings).
148
One interesting possibility is that our biology has turned out to be unsuitable for decision-making in the
world we have created, for example, leading us to overly discount the future in favor of the here and now.
149
Professor Lemley’s discussion includes the following statement: “The role of property theory is an
important one because it provides intellectual heft to justify the expansion and because it offers an
attractive label – ‘free rider’ – that they can use both to identify undesirable conduct and to justify its
suppression.” See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1046. If Professor Lemley’s point is that conversational
property provides a powerfully persuasive framework for articulating the speaker’s actual normative
position on the merits (including benefits arising from that property outcome to themselves) the argument
made in the text applies. If, however, he is saying that the “intellectual heft” and “attractive label” are
being used by corrupt speakers to push an agenda based on unrelated quid pro quo benefits unrelated to the
property outcome, the problem is not mischaracterization but corruption. Although conversational rhetoric
may play a cover role is such situations they require a substantially more powerful response than
vocabulary adjustments.
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therefore, offers significant support to the conclusion that at least some conversational
property capture is likely to occur.

The issue is whether to accept that capture and mitigate by controlling proxy creep or
take the proxy problem on directly.

Four counter arguments, two substantive and two

practical, make a convincing case for strongly preferring the latter approach. The two
substantive arguments involve the significant adverse effects of an acceptance and
mitigation strategy on the property “big picture.”

First, describing certain resource

control debates as “not property” unavoidably reinforces the conversational property
mischaracterization in the remaining contexts. The effect is to liberate some debates at
the price of solidifying, and possibly increasing, the substantial harm proxy reliance
causes in others.

For example, calling intellectual property something else clearly

implies (and could reasonably be viewed as explicitly confirming, especially by those not
paying attention) that using “property” to describe control over real/personal resources
indicates the conversational understanding is appropriate in that context.150 As a result
existing restrictions in those regimes will be increasingly narrowly construed and
consideration of proposed limitations on such owners’ rights will start with a strong bias
against them
. 151

Although the intellectual property debates undoubtedly would benefit

from their escape, the adverse effects of further entrenching a seriously flawed approach
to tangible resource decisions makes acceptance-mitigation at least highly problematic
but more likely disastrous.

150

Cf. Carrier, supra note 9, 52-80 (pointing out the significant role limitations actually play in real
property law).
151
The argument that labeling some debates as “not property” is an incremental step toward the larger goal
is considered below. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
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Second, separating property and non-property analysis fails to acknowledge that the
effectiveness of our resource control decisions depends on viewing them as part of a
single system.152

Specifically, separate treatment significantly interferes with

understanding and assessing interactions. For example, treating allocations of control
over ideas and tangible resources as unrelated issues could easily result in liberal access
to copyrighted works for commentary and criticism under non-property analysis while
simultaneously preventing access to the tangibleresource vehicles and platforms essential
to such uses under the conversational property paradigm.

Additionally, separate

treatment would substantially inhibit transferable learning, such as what kinds and
quantities of control work (or don’t), from our various debates and application
experiences.153 As it is highly improbable we will get either the normative decisions or
technical implementation right the first time, treating different control regimes as distinct
could cause us to repeat previous failed experiments.

The two practical arguments build off these substantive problems of abandonment and
disaggregation. First, because the argument for limiting proxy creep and eliminating the
more general proxy problem is the same, it makes no sense to limit the ultimate objective.
The arguments in favor of acceptance and mitigation frequently obscure this congruence
by intermingling attacks on capture with advocacy for entirely rejecting conversational
152

See John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1077, 1090-1095 (2005); Adam Mossoff, Is Copyright Property?, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 39 (2005)
(noting the difference between intellectual property and physical property rights are merely of degree not
kind and that the same analytical framework applies to both). The problem is similar to the disaggregation
which arises under Hohfeldian system which obscures the common theme connecting all of society’s
control decision-making. See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
153
Intellectual property has much to learn from and to teach real property. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 9.
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property on the merits.154

The issues are distinct. Eliminating inappropriate proxy

reliance only requires participants understand that alternatives merit inquiry before
confirming their adoption of the proxy, not that they ultimately reject the normative
position it reflects.155

Addressing the proxy problem, therefore, only requires a

convincing demonstration that the proper framing of property issues involves choice
among alternatives, not that those supporting the conversational proxy are wrong. The
logic of the former showing applies equally to all proxy situations, meaning successful
argument can simultaneously address and resolve both the specific instance and the more
general problem.

The actual argument for acceptance and mitigation, therefore, must be that the
alternatives-choice point can be successfully communicated only when the conversational
property paradigm has not yet become firmly entrenched.

That argument, however,

confuses the readily conceded proposition that the point is more easily made when the
conversational property proxy is only weakly accepted with the non-sequitur conclusion
that deep entrenchment makes it impossible to eventually generalize.

The conceded

proposition rests on the logical assumption that the time-pressed or energy-constrained
will more likely pay attention when the proxy is tenuous. That argues for starting with
those situations. It does not follow however that the effort must end there. Assuming
their competence to understand and analyze complex issues,156 and recognizing that
154

See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1075 (objecting to the use of land-conversational property paradigm
to frame the intellectual property debate because it produces substantively undesirable outcomes).
155
The proxy problem only involves a failure to analyze, not the ultimate normative outcome. See supra
note xx-yy and accompanying text (noting the problem of confusing mischaracterization with substantive
disagreement).
156
See supra note xx-yy and accompanying text (discussing the much more serious institutional problem if
this cannot be assumed).

Property – Chiappetta

Page 39

success does not mean rejection of the proxy’s substantive position,157 people’s
understanding of the conversational proxy problem developed in the easy cases should be
readily transferable to other more problematic situations and, over time, to all resource
control discussions.158

Second, successful mitigation not only cannot avoid making the general form of the
argument but must eventually reach the understanding that all resource control decisions
pose the same question.

Mitigation’s need to come up with new labels reveals why.

The “property” label currently serves a dual role – it can refer to conversational property
but it also serves as the de facto capstone reference for society’s discussion of the
aggregate body of interdependent resource control decisions.

Successful mitigation’s

limitation of the term’s definitional reach, therefore, requires generating new valueneutral,159 appropriately descriptive and linguistically appealing160 labels for the now
distinct non-property regimes such as “the- regime-formerly-know-as-intellectual157

Success only requires individuals understand that analysis is required, not that their analysis come out a
particular way. As it is would be unsurprising to discover that when conversational property rhetoric is
most deeply entrenched it reflects a strong normative preference for that outcome on the merits, eliminating
proxy reliance may frequently not produce different substantive outcomes. See supra notes xx-yy and
accompanying text (distinguishing between capture and normative disagreement regarding the outcome).
158
I believe this is a logical extension of Professor Carrier’s approach which emphasizes the existing
limitations on real property rights in connection with their (inevitable) application to intellectual property.
See Carrier, supra note 9. If that “not absolute” argument can be successfully made regarding intellectual
property there seems little reason to stop at that point. Why not next make the more general point that the
absolute real property proxy does not accurately define even real property debate? After all, the numerous
exceptions arose in that context and certainly must point out property’s inherent flexibility as a tool rather
than a preordained outcome.
159
Many of the existing new intellectual property label proposals reveal that those favoring conversational
property proxies hardly have a lock on semantic gamesmanship, so finding suitable replacement terms will
not be easy. See supra note xx (discussing some of the less than objective proposed replacements for
intellectual property). Professor Lemley suggests the use of the more neutral “IP” in the (I believe
unlikely) hope we will eventually forget its origins. See Lemley, supra note 26, at 1075. There appears to
be little consideration of what we might use to replace “property” in its capstone sense.
160
Public adoption requires new terms resonate with the target users. Cf. Yu, supra note 9, at 6 (noting
problems in adopting new, unfamiliar terminology); Lemley, supra note 26, at 1075 (noting the unlikely
adoption of the existing proposed intellectual property alternatives, presumably in part because users
would find them unsatisfactory).
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property” and for the general control topic “fo rmerly-know-as-property.”161

That

process requires understanding not merely the differences between “real-property-nowproperty” and “IP-whatever-it-is-to-be-called” but the common theme which defines
“general-resource-control law-but-now-needing-a-new-name.”162 As inventing an entire
new genus and species vocabulary and imbuing it with proper meanings requires the
same fundamental substantive understanding as clarifies the existing terminology, there
seems little practical point in engaging in the former exercise.163

PART III: Persistent Normative Differences, Practical Consequencesand the “Real”
Property Question

The functional approach to property law provides a number of important practical
benefits.

By defining property as society’s decisions allocating varying kinds and

degrees of control over contested resources it clarifies that public policy debate is
fundamentally driven by, and should therefore focus on, our widely varying normative
positions.

Banished from the discussion are hyperbolic and polarizing “good/bad” and

“yes or no” mischaracterizations as well as conversational property’s claim to preference
along with its distorting assumptions. So too is the misunderstanding that property only
161

It might be argued that a new capstone term is neither desirable nor required. Cf. Richard M. Stallman,
Did You Say “Intellectual Property?” It’s a Seductive Mirage, http://www.fsf.org/licensing/essays/notipr.xhtml (making the case for abandoning the capstone “intellectual property” as having no substantive
content). That position ignores that avoiding abandonment and disaggregation generates a practical need
for a common reference term. See supra note xx; Yu, supra note 9, at 5-6 (convincingly making the
capstone argument regarding intellectual property based on both substantive inter-relationships, such as the
channeling of subject matter from copyright or trademark toward patent law and real world transactional
needs (assignment of all “x” rights) and practice requirements (something to call individuals who
specializes in those regimes)). Cf., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1075 (noting that part of the power of
intellectual property is that it “captures some of the similarities between the different fields it unites”).
162
Cf., Mossoff, supra note 84 (describing a unified view of property as essential); supra notes xx-yy and
accompanying text (discussing the disaggregation problem).
163
See id.
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concerns things we can touch, thus permitting us to deal with every important resource
and relevant circumstance while still viewing and treating each specific debate as part of
an interrelated and interdependent whole.

The functional approach’s most important benefit, however, is what it reveals about the
decision-making process itself. A brief summary is in order before offering the detailed
supporting discussion.

By establishing that fundamental normative differences drive

disagreement in property law the approach demonstrates that debate seekingabsolute
truth is a doomed enterprise. By focusing on the practical effects of property – control
over contested resources – the approach clarifies that insistence on one’s own view of the
right may doom society. That same practical focus also offers an alternative. We could
chose to treat public policy debate as a joint effort to find a practical solution which
delivers the goods – that is a property regime which affords in the aggregate and over
time each member of society sufficient control over resources to permit pursuit of a
rational life plan. Deciding whether to pursue that alternative, like all values questions,
does not have a demonstrably correct answer,164 but will turn on individual normative
predilections under the circumstances. Consequently, the functional approach does not
conclusively resolve our property issues. It does, however, accomplish this effort’s far
more modest practical goal of better framing and thus improving our understanding of
property debate.165
164

See supra note xx (describing my related difficulty with describing John Rawls’ similar difference
principle as “just”).
165
The functional approach also clarifies how courts should apply the regime. When dealing with existing
law it reveals that merely asserting a property right, either as a party or in a holding, is meaningless.
Invocation of property requires specification of precisely where on the control continuum of rights,
conditions, limitations and obligations the ownership claim or confirmed right has been placed, including a
careful description of what kind and how much. Consequently, neither an argument nor a judicial decision
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The predicate assumption for my position is the existence and persistence of
disagreement. If everyone agreed on a single guiding principle, property law would
involve no more than its mechanical application to the particular facts at hand. Although
that implementation process would present substantial data collection and interpretation
difficulties, resolution of resulting disagreements would only depend on straight-forward
(relatively speaking) technical expertise.

Part I reveals the much more complicated

reality.166 It goes (almost) without saying those debates reflect significant differences of
opinion.

In a heterogeneous society one should not expect otherwise.167 And the

thousands of years those differences have endured despite constant social wrangling over
the “true” meaning of property168 indicates we should not expect a group epiphany
anytime soon.169
attention:

Until (or rather, unless) that occurs three central questions merit

What is the nature of our differences, why do those differences persist and,

should ever conclude “and therefore plaintiff has a property right.” Rather they should start with “the
plaintiff has the following property right.” Additionally, whatever one’s views regarding judicial
“activism” in other contexts, the fundamental role of normative conflict in resource control determinations
counsels for at least considerable circumspection in judicial creation of new property rights. See, e.g., Intel
Corporation v. Hamidi, 30 Cal.4th 1342, 1360-1364, 71 P.3d 296, 308-311, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 47-50 (2003)
(struggling with the complex policy considerations and ultimately declining to create a property right). Cf.
Penner, supra note 22, at 715-724 (discussing the problematic outcomes in the International News and
Moore cases, albeit based primarily on his concern that clear guidance is lacking rather than the court’s
fundamental institutional unsuitability to making the required normative decision).
166
See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (identifying a range of normative views) and xx-yy
(discussing a variety of examples).
167
See Locke, supra note 3, Sec. 98 p. 143 (“the variety of opinions, and contrariety of interest which
unavoidable happen in all collections of men”).
168
The Romans hardly started the property inquiry, but that ready reference gives us a few thousand years
of effort. See e.g., Marx & Engels, supra note 1, at 167; Carol M. Rose, Roman, Road and Romantic
Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the Information Age, 66 L. AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2003)
(discussing various Roman views of non-exclusive property). For yet earlier societies’ attention to the
issue see, e.g., Richard C. Ellickson & Charles Dia. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt
and Israel, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV 321 (1995).
169
Conflicting interpretations of the Biblical sources justifying property law make it unlikely that our
differences will be resolved by external or higher authority. See, e.g., Marx & Engels, supra note 1, at 167;
Locke, supra note 3, at Sec 25 p. 111.
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finally, how do those persistent differences affect our property law decision-making when
viewed through the functional lens?

One relatively recent example – the intellectual property debate over extending the term
of copyright protection – provides a useful vehicle for the inquiry. The 1998 passage of
the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act added 20 years to the terms of United
States copyrights.170 Framed in functional terms, the property law dispute is whether the
resulting increased control is “correct” in degree. Those who believe that property rights
in intellectual products should be guided by market efficiency principles arrive at the
answer by assessing whether the economic benefits generated (i.e., the increase or
acceleration of economic output resulting from the additional encouragement of
supplemental internalized returns) offset the related costs (in economic rents and
deadweight loss or supra-optimal investment).171 The resoundingly “no” answer is best
exemplified by Justice Breyer’s well-articulated dissent in the Supreme Court’s
consideration of the matter in Eldred.172 The Justice’s case for over-propertization (too
much control) demonstrates that the extension offers very little, if any, economic benefit
in compensation for the substantial costs arising from the additional foreclosure of use by
others.173

170

Pub.L. 105-298, Secs. 102(b) and (d), 112 Stat. 2827-2828 (amending 17 U.S.C. Secs. 302, 304).
See supra note xx (discussing the efficiency-utility approach).
172
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242 (2000) (Justice Breyer dissenting). The Court only considered
the extension of existing copyrights under the Copyright Clause and the extension of existing and future
copyrights under the First Amendment. Id., at 198. The majority objected that Justice Breyer’s policy
arguments ignored these limitations. Id., at 193 n. 1 and 199 n. 4. For the very different purposes of this
article, however, it is the normative view not the technical merits which are important.
173
Id., at 254-257 (Justice Breyer dissenting).
171
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The Act’s namesake’s view provides a good normative counter-point.174 That analysis
starts from the substantially different proposition that a work should be owned by its
creator (almost) absolutely and (probably) forever.175 Although varying philosophical
justifications for such a “natural rights” approach affect its particulars,176 it is sufficient
here to recognize that they all establish a significantly different evaluative framework
leading to a substantially different control outcome. Rather than the state creating rights
to achieve economic efficiency, copyright law’s function is to recognize and perfect a
pre-existing right owed to the creator.177

From that perspective Justice Breyer’s

argument is hardly determinative; it is barely relevant. The natural rights believer does
not seek to justify the 20-year term extension against efficiency challenges. As best,
therefore, those efficiency consequences are an unfortunate but necessary by-product of

174

There are, of course, numerous possible normative positions, however, the point can be made (and more
clearly) by focusing on the two addressed in the text. See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text
(discussing various normative justifications for property law). It merits mention that even when parties are
in abstract philosophical accord conflict can arise from practical concerns. For example, one might
consider the economic efficiency approach theoretically preferable but resist its actual use in favor of
another approach because of concerns regarding our ability to quantify benefits and costs or the
applicability of the related theoretical assumptions in the real world. See Chander, supra note 9, at 781791;
175
Eldred, 537 U.S., at 256 (Justice Breyer dissenting: “After all, the statute was named after a Member of
Congress [Sonny Bono], who, the legislative history records, "wanted the term of copyright protection to
last forever." 144 Cong. Rec. H9952 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1998) (statement of Rep. Mary Bono). See also
Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess., 94 (1995) (hereinafter House Hearings) (statement of Rep. Sonny Bono) (questioning why
copyrights should ever expire); ibid. (statement of Rep. Berman) ("I guess we could ... just make a
permanent moratorium on the expiration of copyrights"); id., at 230 (statement of Rep. Hoke) ("Why 70
years? Why not forever? Why not 150 years?"); cf. ibid. (statement of the Register of Copyrights) (In
Copyright Office proceedings, "[t]he Songwriters Guild suggested a perpetual term"); id., at 234
(statement of Quincy Jones) ("I'm particularly fascinated with Representative Hoke's statement.... [W]hy
not forever?"); id., at 277 (statement of Quincy Jones) ("If we can start with 70, add 20, it would be a good
start")”).
176
Although they all part with efficiency, there are important differences between a Lockean, Hegelian or
divine justification of natural rights. See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (discussing the various
sources for “natural rights” views).
177
See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Exclusivity – The Roadblock to Democracy?, Buffalo Legal Studies Research
Paper Series, paper No. 2006-002, 8-9 available online at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=876471.
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achieving the “right” outcome. The truly committed may simply ignore them, their
concern being that the extension still fails to grant sufficient creator dominion.178

The above example reveals the essential cause and nature of our disagreements. They do
not arise from failing to perceive, misunderstanding or miscalculating a position’s
objective consequences.
matters.

Typically the parties can come to substantial accord on such

Our disagreements are based on conflicting normative views regarding the

relative importance of those consequences – in the above example, very different beliefs
regarding whether maximized economic output or creators’ control over their creations
represents the preeminent, if not only, value.179

Identifying our disagreements as normative helps answer the second question – why
those disagreements persist. Partly it is because normative differences cause us to talk
past one another.180

Utilitarians appeal to economic efficiency while natural rights

advocates hear lack of respect for creators’ rights. Natural rights proponents use the
imagery of theft while utilitarians see deadweight loss.181

Unsurprisingly, therefore,

much public policy dialog involves public characterizations of opponents as blockheads
failing to see the light, heathens needing conversion or villains driven by evil in their

178

See supra note xx (noting that a number of extension proponents saw 20 years as not enough).
Of course, we might seek a compromise providing for some of each. That would merely shift the
normative disagreement from either-or to how much of each, still forcing us to deal with our different
normative priorities. Actual willingness to yield normative ground and its practical justification are
considered infra at notes xx-yy and accompanying text.
180
See Yu, supra note 9, 9-11. These differences can also permit us to talk past each other, deliberately
avoiding the inconvenient need to actually recognize our fundamental differences as discussed below in the
text. The result is to make talking to each other even more difficult, so I have focused on the more easily
resolved unintentional situation.
181
Id.
179
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hearts (if not souls).182

Disagreement persists not only because epithets tend to divide

rather than join, but because we fail to perceive that our opponents’ insistence on
irrelevancies neither reflects an inability to see nor a devious refusal to acknowledge the
obvious path to common goals, but rather their belief in and pursuit of fundamentally
different goals.

Although talking with each other would improve the situation it cannot resolve our
differences.

Reaching normative agreement requires change at the most fundamental

level – altering the beliefs on which conflicting lexical ordering of consequences rests.
The mechanisms necessary for that conversion do not exist.

Appeals to reason are

manifestly inadequate. Reason applies logic to objective facts. Although such analyses
can be extremely helpful – every set of beliefs produces practical effects and it is useful
to understand what they are likely to be183 – they do not address the root cause of the
problem.

Because all logic builds from foundational assumptions, when those

assumptions are rejected even the most flawlessly reasoned argument utterly collapses.184
That is the case with the values we assign to the consequences of implementing our
respective property norms.185

For example, Justice Breyer’s efficiency argument that

extending copyright’s term will reduce aggregate social wealth in terms of net goods and

182

Id.
A normative view’s objective consequences serve as important inputs particularly when new data or
assessment mechanisms become available. Although such information is relevant, it cannot resolve the
underlying value dispute about how much those consequences matter.
184
Descartes “method” defines a method which fails completely when divergent beliefs preclude agreeing
on the requisite foundational axioms of “indubitable certainty.” See Van Doren, supra note 7, at 204-205
(describing the method’s starting point and noting the difficulty of application when debate moves from the
material to the spiritual); Rawls, supra note 15, at 36-37 (discussing the priority problem; Rawls uses
intuitions to describe what I refer to as beliefs.). See also infra note xx (Godel).
185
See, e.g., Rawls, supra note 15, at 36-37 (discussing the priority problem; Rawls using intuitions to
describe what I refer to as beliefs).
183
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services produced must be taken very seriously.186

However, it cannot and will not

convince those who believe that accepting those consequences are not merely justified
but required bythe need to recognize the creator’s superior natural claim of right.187
Similarly, the tragedy of the commons and related return-internalization and stability
arguments commonly presented as the basis for existing real property law are only
conclusive when one starts from the assumption that efficient outcomes are the pertinent
measure of “right.”188

For those holding communitarian values those same arguments

are worse than irrelevant; they constitute the very reason for rejecting private property.189
By talking with each other we may come to understand and acknowledge the internal
logic of each other’s arguments and even respect the related passion, but having rejected
the predicate assumptions we will remain unmoved.190

186

See supra note xx (discussing Justice Breyer’s convincing efficiency analysis in Eldred).
That conflict hardly exhausts the basis for normative dismissal of efficiency arguments (or supporting
them). Another compelling argument against efficiency-based intellectual property arguments, at least
standing alone, involves their distributional effects. See, e.g., Chander, supra note 9, at 3 and 30; Rawls,
supra note 15, at 69 and 242-246. The Eldridge decision itself, of course, provides an interesting example
demonstrating clearly that where one starts determines the importance ascribed to an argument. The
majority does not dispute Justice Breyer’s “calculator”-based efficiency determines, they simply deem
them irrelevant because in their view the “right” answer depends on the “calendar.” See Eldridge, 537
U.S., at 209 n. 16.
188
See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 537-539 (“a focus on stable ownership value is
necessary to solve Coase’s open puzzle of arranging legal entitlements in order to maximize economic
efficiency); Lemley, supra note 26, at 1037-1040 (outlining the internalization of returns-avoidance of freeriding argument supporting real property law prior to arguing its inapplicability to intellectual property
law).
189
The proto-communists and the communists argued against private tangible property precisely because in
their view of a just society internalized personal returns on capital investments were a bad not a good thing.
See generally, Marx and Engels, supra note 1 (in particular Part 2 of the Communist Manifesto summarizes
the basic argument).
190
An interesting example is the tendency in intellectual property debate to assume a utility-efficiency
framework and then offer the consumer surplus transfer, rent-seeking and dead-weight loss effects of overpropertization as though they were dispositive. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1058-1065. Such
arguments although flawless within their own paradigm are entirely unconvincing to those who apply
different normative standards. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (discussing how different
normative views of copyright term extension affect concerns over the resulting limitation of the public
domain).
187
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The reason for persistent disagreement is now apparent: Having carved away reason all
that remains are the obviously circular argument that one’s position is preferable because
its produces more desirable outcomes or the naked and wholly unconvincing assertion
that particular predicate values are self-evidently or intuitively “right.”191 It is hardly
surprising that we all emerge from normative debate more than occasionally irritated but
never shaken in our fervently held conviction that our values define “just” property law.

The short answer to the second question, therefore, is that normative differences persist
because there are many perceived “truths”192 each irrefutable and dear to those adopting
the related foundational values and beliefs and unsupported rubbish to those who reject
them.193 To be clear, that statement is only intended to reflect our circumstances not
some meta-physical insight. I am not arguing no absolute truths exist, that values and
191

Lacking external verification such an assertion comes down to “because that is what I believe” which
readily translates into simply “because.” See Charles Van Doren, supra note 7, at xxi-xxii (discussing the
faith that one’s views are correct); Rawls, supra note 15, at 37 (stating that in the absence of external
criteria “rational discussion [comes] to an end”); Ian Shapiro, John Locke’s Democratic Theory, in Locke,
supra note 3, at 320-322 (discussing John Locke’s argument concerning the meaning of the Scriptures).
192
An interesting analogy is the mathematical effort to define space demonstrating that where one starts
affects how one concludes. Van Doren explains that as space is described and controlled by our
assumptions “there is no such thing as space. Instead there are as many spaces as there are mathematicians
and nonmathematicians.” See Van Doren, supra note 7, at 272. Normative disagreements, like those in
property law, start at the beginning – the unprovability of our varying baseline assumptions. See infra
notes xx-yy and accompanying text; Chiappetta Trademarks, supra note 53, at 39 n. 30 (I normally
wouldn’t shout myself out here (if that can be done via a footnote no one reads) but it gives me the
opportunity to clarify and correct a past error in my reference to Kurt Godel in my articulation of the point.
Professor Dennis Karjala has helpfully explained that Godel’s Incompleteness Theorem concerns
unprovability within a formal system, not the unprovability of the assumptions on which that system is
based. He is, of course, right. My point about the unprovability of normative assumptions stands, but as I
have insisted regarding Blackstone and absolute property, dialog is improved by eliminating non-existent
arguments. That resolved, Godel’s theorem remains relevant but in a different way. For an interesting
consideration of how the theorem affects the “truth” of every formal definitional system, including
normative views regarding property (mine not excepted), see Roger Penrose, THE EMPEROR’S NEW MIND,
138-154 (Oxford, New Preface Edition, 1999). Charles Van Doren also offers a similar albeit brief
explanation of how Godel’s proof demonstrates the uncertainty of all “knowledge.” See Van Doren, supra
note 7, at 340. In short, even if we are certain that our assumptions are correct we should be circumspect
that our worldview is complete. For a wonderful articulation of the need to maintain substantial humility in
that regard see Richard Dawkins, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER 38-39 (Norton 1996).
193
Cf. Locke, supra note 3, LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 225 (“For every church is orthodox to itself;
to others, erroneous or heretical.”).
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morality are only relative, or even that we are mistaken to follow our intuitions or beliefs
regarding what is “right.” The argument is only that for the present we lack the means to
convince others truth has been discovered and we possess it.194 Consequently, the very
best public policy debate aimed at convincing others they are “wrong” can produce is a
grudging acknowledgment that every position is reasonable provided its assumptions are
accepted.

Learning to argue with rather than past each other about who is right may,

therefore, help us better understand the sincerity with which we each hold to our differing
values and beliefs, but it will not make those differences disappear.195

The last and crucial step involves assessing what the irreducible nature of our normative
differences tells us about public policy debate when framed by the functional approach.
The basic message is, of course, that property decisions made despite persistent
normative disagreement must produce winners and losers.

The central question,

therefore, is how those winners and losers are determined and with what attendant
consequences.

Treating existing law as determinative can be quickly dismissed as confusing legal
enforceability with normative accord.196

For example, the Court’s determination in

194

Although the statement in the text may sound “normative” to someone who is certain such truth exists, it
does not refute that position it merely asserts that over the many years humankind has debated truth
(regarding property and otherwise) we have never actually agreed on the answer.
195
The point here is only that normative differences will persist, not that they make any resolution
impossible. See infra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (discussing compromise and the related decision
to cede normative ground despite continued conflict). Cf. Rawls, supra note 15, at 196.
196
Now is the appropriate time for the obligatory, but exceedingly apt, reference to David Hume’s
observation that merely because something “is” does not resolve whether it “should” be. See David Hume,
A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Book III, Part I, Section 1, final paragraph, available online at
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treatise_of_Human_Nature/Book_3:_Of_morals#Sect._I:_Moral_distinction
s_not_deriv.E2.80.99d_from_reason
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Kelo197 that property law permits a Taking into private hands determines the rights not
only of the particular parties involved but affects the legal outcome of all such disputes.
Similarly, the Court’s Eldred198 holding that Congress acted within its power in
extending the term of copyright law on existing works defines creators’ existing rights of
control, the reduces the public domain and with it the ability of others to create derivative
works.

Equally clearly neither decision finally resolved the underlying normative

conflicts.

Lively debate continues over whether each reflects the “right” social

outcome.199

A related and equally erroneous position would be to treat property as solely derivative of
more “foundational”

public policy decisions,

determinations determinative.

thus

making those antecedent

For example, it could be argued that the adoption of a

market economy makes efficiency norms the primary measure of “good” property law.200
Although logically coherent internally,201 the problem is that the existence of a market
economy only demonstrates efficiency values have (so far) prevailed, not that all have
197

__ U.S. __ (2005). See supra notes xx-yy (briefly discussing the case).
537 U.S. 186 (2003). See supra notes xx-yy (briefly discussing the case).
199
See supra notes xx-yy (discussing the continuing attempts to deal with Kelo) and Mossoff, supra note
152, 31 n. 12 (noting continued criticism of the outcome in Eldred and citing a variety of sources). Even
in the most activist view of the judiciary it is at best (even to themselves) only a government decisionmaking institution, not a priesthood capable of divining absolute right. See Wikipedia, Supreme Court of
the United States, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_Court_of_the_United_States (“as Justice Robert
H. Jackson once famously remarked, ‘We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final.’").
200
Property literature offers numerous examples of arguments starting from the premise that the goal of the
property regime is efficiency and moving seamlessly on to dismissing those proposals which fail to
advance that objective. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 26, at 1031. Even well established
conceptualizations such as the tragedy of the commons analysis of real property law assumes rather than
demonstrates that because ownership internalizes returns thus increasing investment that approach is
normatively desirable. See supra note xx (discussing the rejection of that premise by communitarians).
201
If we agree to use market exchange to generate economically efficient allocation of resources that
system’s assumptions undeniably require particular property outcomes. For example, individuals must
privately control the resources that are to be exchanged and appropriate balances must be struck regarding
the kind and degree of that control used to resolve the public goods problem.
198
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accepted that they should.202

Those who believe natural rights justify compensating a

real property owner for every regulatory Taking

203

or who reject the market’s

distributional effects204 would readily concede that such views fit poorly within the
existing market economy’s general efficiency paradigm. That is not the same, however,
as agreeing that poor fit conclusively demonstrates that their views should be abandoned
in favor of market-based determination of property winners and losers.205

Rather they

would argue, have argued and actually prevailed with the position that the market should
be abandoned.

The better approach recognizes that existing law and the adoption (or rejection) of a
market economy are specific outputs of a social meta-accord use to resolve the
unavoidable normative disagreements in a heterogeneous society.206 As such they do not
represent a final determination immutably controlling property debate. Instead they are
operational decisions required for the on-going functioning of a mutually beneficial
cooperative enterprise and, as such, remain subject to challenge, reexamination and
alteration.

Such tie-breaking systems (for convenience I refer to them as “political”)

may, of course, take many forms. However, as only participatory politics explicitly
acknowledges that usefully addressing conflicts between individual normative
202

Mr. Hume is again is irresistible. See supra note xx.
See supra note xx (quoting supporters of Oregon’s Measure 37).
204
See supra note xx (discussing the distributional concerns).
205
John Rawls observation is apt: “They are designed to achieve different ends, the [ideal market process]
leading to efficiency, [the ideal legislative process] if possible to justice. See Rawls, supra note 15, at 316.
206
The following analysis is concerned with the practical not the just. Consequently, although it clearly
implicates social contract theory, it is the practical desirability of cooperative action despite disagreement
not its philosophical justifications which matter. Thus, beyond that fundamental point of agreement my
analysis need not address, much less resolve, the debate among the likes of Rousseau, Locke, Hobbes and
Rawls over the moral justifications for forming and abandoning the social contract. See Rawls, supra note
15, at 10; Shapiro, supra note 191, at 323-325 (discussing the conflicting views of Rousseau, Locke,
Hobbes and others).
203
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preferences requires broad-based involvement,207 its examination best furthers my
purposes.208

In such political systems individual members (directly, but more likely

through representatives) advocate vigorously for adoption of their preferred outcome.209
However, provided the meta-system’s rules are followed, win or lose all society’s
members accept (and agree that the state should compel others to accept) the decision
regardless of whether it conforms to their personal values.210

The basis for such

compliance is not that the participants are convinced the process produces normatively
correct decisions but the practical recognition that binding decisions are essential to
continued mutually beneficial coexistence.211

207

See, e.g. Rawls, supra note 15, at 439 (noting Mill’s acknowledgement of the principle as well);
Shapiro, supra note 191, at 323.
208
The actual level of participation - decision-making by unanimity, majority rule or something else - does
not affect the argument and thus need not be resolved for this purpose. Additionally, the consequences for
social cohesion discussed below apply to less and even non- participatory systems, although the methods of
dealing with them in such systems will differ. The philosophical question of which system best handles
the described concerns can, thankfully, be left for other efforts.
209
This understanding reveals the inappropriate nature of the increasingly popular use of the epithet form of
the word “politics” – used to accuse those who disagree of “just being political” or “playing politics.”
Vigorous advocacy for conflicting positions is the very essence of political decision-making, not egregious
misuse of the system. See De Tocqueville, supra note 74, at 245 (the “majority lives in perpetual
adoration of itself”); Rawls, supra note 15, at 195-196 (discussing the importance of acknowledging the
loyal opposition).
210
The point is only that as a practical matter members generally will acquiesce, not why they should. See
Shapiro, supra note 191, at 323-325 (discussing the differing views of Locke and Hobbes of the basis for
the social contract and the related question of when acquiescence ceases to be required); Rawls, supra note
15, at 308-312.
211
See, e.g., Jared Diamond, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL 283-288 (noting the mutual benefit theory but also
arguing for other factors as playing an important role in the early stages of the development of human
society); Rawls, supra note 15, at 456 (the social enterprise as “a cooperative venture for mutual
advantage” pursued despite our disagreements). Rawls goes on to describe participatory majority rule as
“not a contest between interests, but as an attempt to find the best policy as defined by the principles of
justice” (id., at 314) and asserts that “we normally assume that an ideally conducted discussion among
many persons is more likely to arrive at the correct conclusion (by a vote if necessary) than the
deliberations of any one of them by himself” (id., at 315). Those statements risk confusing the kind of
objective truth science might generate with truths which cannot be verified. See, e.g., Ken Alder, THE
MEASURE OF THINGS 315-319 (Abacus 2004) (discussing accuracy in science, the convergence on scientific
truth through cooperative effort and the problems created when the “right answer” is unknown); Van
Doren, supra note 7, at 254-255 (science telling us more about what everything is while telling us less and
less why). I, therefore, prefer the more practical view of the “use of the procedure of majority rule as a
way of achieving political settlement” (id., at 318), which applies independently of adherence to Rawl’s or
any other principle of justice and Alexis de Tocqueville’s explanation that “the people … understand that to
profit from society’s benefits, one must submit to its burdens” and “obeys society … because he knows that

Property – Chiappetta

Page 53

The crucial question is how that model fairs when used to determine property winners
and losers.

The short answer is that if property politics is treated as a system of pure

“competitive” justice,212 the practical effects of resource control decisions are more
likely to break the social than the normative ties.213

Avoiding that outcome requires

property debate include a perfect justice independent criterion.214 Specifically, unless
property decisions actually afford each of its members sufficient control over resources to
pursue a rational life plan the meta-accord will not hold and the society will dissolve.215
Or stated in normative terms, because our value differences will inevitably persist,
sustaining heterogeneous cooperative society over the long run requires shifting the focus
of our property debate from seeking rules consistent with our individual preferences to
rules which deliver the goods, even if we could “win” under a strict application of the
political process.

The argument starts from the functional definition: that property allocates control over
contested resources – meaning its rules resolve disputes when there is not “enough, and

… union [with others] cannot exist without a regulating power.”). De Tocqueville, supra note 74, at 9 and
61. It is also interesting to reflect on De Tocqueville’s assertion that part of what makes democracy work
in America is that we are very similar. Id., at 158-159. It would appear that the passage of time has either
made us less able or willing to ignore our differences or, perhaps, as we have tangibly prospered we are
better position (for better or worse) to focus on our philosophical differences.
212
“Pure” justice defines the correct result as whatever results from following the systems rules. That
allows, if not induces, parties to compete against one another rather than engage in cooperative problemsolving. See Rawls, supra note 15, at 75 (using the example of gambling).
213
Although I argue below that the property law’s resource control effects makes it a special case, clearly
when any normative differences are strongly enough held the same consequence can result. See supra note
xx.
214
Id., at 74.
215
John Locke differentiates between destruction of government and society. Certainly the effects
described will bring about the fall of the former, but most likely will also undo the bonds of the latter as
well. See supra note xx.

Property – Chiappetta

Page 54

as good, left in common.”216

As property winners are pleased, it is the consequences of

losing which require inspection. Property decisions invariably have a practical effect on
individual ability to accomplish personal goals.217 They not only restrict an individual’s
roles and level of participation in society,218 they tangibly affect the ability to pursue
one’s personal life plan (including providing or denying access to the necessary resources
and restricting the ability to self-define219), the conditions of existence and at the margin
existence itself.220 The difficulty will generally emerge over time. Property rules which
concern only one or a small group of individuals, such as government Takings, the
misuse of economic or biological data and direct free speech conflicts, will require
multiple events before they have an appreciable impact on society as a whole.

Others

will be systemic, such as the gradual eroding of individual circumstances through the
distributional consequences of taxation policies or the basic operation of a market
economy221 In all events, if society’s property decisions do not deliver adequate control
to permit the majority of society to pursue a rational life plan, not only their desire but

216

Locke, supra note 3, at Sec. 27 on 112.
Obviously, all normative debates carry significant consequences. The “special” property law
characteristic is that the political outcome virtually always restricts or eliminates freedom of individual
action. John Rawls view of this result as adversely affecting one’s ability to achieve “happiness” through
accomplishment of a reasonable life plan is obviously central to the following analysis. See Rawls, supra
note 15, at 480-482. When other debates have this result, they likely carry the same consequences. .
218
This can occur because lack of resources locks them into a particular social “class” or because it
practically forecloses opportunities. See Van Doren, supra note 7, at 6-7 (describing the Indian caste
system) and Rawls, supra note 15, at 62-64.
219
See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying text (unsurprisingly, many of the normative justifications
reflect one or more of the effects of control on an individual’s life plan).
220
The lack of food and shelter are obvious, however, they only reflect one of many possibilities. For
example, patent limitations on access to pharmaceuticals is no less devastating than having nothing to eat.
See, e.g., Frederick M. Abbot, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the
Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L.317 (2005) (discussing the on-going issues regarding access
to medicines protected under patent law).
221
See supra note xx.
217
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their ability to adhere to the political meta-accord will disappear222 and with it the society
it sustains.223

It might be argued that despite the tangible consequences social cohesion will be
maintained if the losers believe they had been treated fairly. For example, it might be
argued that being given equal opportunity to succeed should suffice whatever the actual
outcome. There are significant practical problems with clinging to that hope.

If in

application a society’s rules impose actual and substantial hardship on some members
while others benefit sometimes considerably, the basic premise of acquiescence for
reciprocal beneficial is undelivered, if not an outright deception.

Additionally,

frequently theoretical equality of opportunity translates into the status of actual loser in
ways not easily attributed (if at all) to personal failures (e.g., the effects of the market on
those skills are not in demand224 or the fact that we start market race from unequal
positions225), many outcomes are unlikely to be viewed by those adversely affected as

222

Cf. Singer, supra note 121, at (3) (discussing the “precarious position of non-owners”).
I make no pretense to historical expertise and recognize that causes of historical events are hard to
identify with certainty. There are, however, numerous examples where property disputes have been an
important, if not a determinative, factor in social disintegration – the French (“let them eat cake”) and
Russian (the Marxist attack on bourgeois property – see generally Marx and Engels, supra note 1) come to
mind. Additionally, looking at the United States experience the two great social “adjustments” both have
significant property issues at their core: no taxation (taking my property) without representation
(considering my views and needs) in the revolution (see, e.g., Van Doren, supra note 7, at 223) and the
prominent role of slavery (destruction of Southerner’s property) in the United States Civil War (see id.. at
275-278). Shortfalls affecting only small groups of individuals will be treated as law enforcement
problems. However, although they will not trigger dramatic change they still constitute avoidable
disruptions in society caused by a failure to acknowledge those individuals needs.
224
Given the frequency with which actual outcomes fail to projected results of theoretical programs, one
must wonder whether some fundamental human character trait makes us fundamentally ill-suited to dealing
with the issues we face. See generally, Barbara W. Tuchman, THE MARCH OF FOLLY (Knoff 1984); supra
note xx.
225
A market enthusiast might argue that because its dispassionate operation offers equality of access losers
should view resource shortcomings as the consequence of their own actions – in effect they bear the blame,
not society. This article is not the place to address the difficulties with that argument (most notably that
we start “in the middle” rather than on a level playing field – see William Gates, Sr. interesting
observations in this regard concerning his support for the inheritance tax, supra note xx). John Rawls
223
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“just.” Therefore, far from assuaging the pain of control shortfalls, “fairness” generally
aligns with actual outcomes further undermining loyalty and commitment to the
society.226

Nor can appeal to fidelity to principle avoid the problem. Those who disagree with the
principle embodied in the rules will not be converted merely because it has been adopted
by others, even a majority of their political peers.

And even those who strive to put

fidelity to either that incorporated principle or more generally to the social meta-accord
first, will generally find the practical consequences of property law overwhelming.
When a society’s property decisions do not deliver sufficient resource control continued
allegiance would require, in Rawl’s words, such an astounding degree of altruism227 that
all but the most fervently committed will find the social bargain is one they simply
cannot keep.228

A functional assessment reveals that treating the political meta-system solely as a set of
procedural rules umpiring a contest over which of our beliefs will prevail may be at odds
with the continuation of the very cooperative enterprise thatsystem is designed to foster.
However, the prospect of social dissolution cannot command we abandon politics as the
pursuit of “right,” absolute or personal.

Whether social dissolution is a good or bad

thing is itself a normative proposition which cannot be definitively resolved.

In

provides an interesting response. Although he includes “fair equality of opportunity” as part of his second
principle of justice he finds it insufficient to provide justice. He, therefore, specifically adds the outcome
constraining “difference principle.” See Rawls, supra note 15, at 263-267.
226
One need not be directly affected to join the dissent. Even winners whose values make them unwilling
to accept the negative consequences for losers will share and support these views.
227
See Rawls, supra note 15, at 155 and 164-165 (explaining that individuals are highly unlikely to forgo
individual reciprocal benefits merely for the benefit of others).
228
See id., at 88-89 and 153.
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particular, many believe that holding to one’s personal principles is itself a core, if not the
preeminent, value.

All the functional approach tells us is that as doing so may deliver

property outcomes which fail to deliver the goods with consequences certainly meriting
serious consideration. That consideration would do well to reflect on the additional fact
that when discussion ends and other means of conflict resolution are employed it is
unclear who will leave, on what terms and, perhaps most critically, what will be left for
those who remain.229

The functional definition’s emphasis on practical consequences not only identifies the
problem, but provides an alternative.

The effects on social cohesion replaces the

problematic “finding the one true property law” and “a competition among truths with
winners and losers” characterizations with a substantially different property question – is
fidelity to continued reciprocally beneficial cooperation among those who in hold
different views of the truth the superior “good.” The correct response, of course, is no
more demonstrable than any other normative proposition.

Whether the "greater good”

trumps individual beliefs turns on one’s individual intuitions and beliefs applied to the
particular circumstances. Most likely many will discover the answer is not absolute –
sometimes it will be yes and sometimes it will be no.

Moreover, even a yes answer does not guarantee easy or even successful resolution.
Adding substantive outcome constraints creates significant normative stresses and poses
substantial practical difficulties. Returning to our earlier example, copyright extension

229

Revolutions are unpredictable things, rarely turning out the way their instigators envision. See supra
notes xx and yy.
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ceases to be framed as a contest between efficiency and natural rights (to pick but two
normative positions) but in terms of ensuring the control over expression permitsboth
creators and subsequent users to pursue rational life plans.230 Such a copyright law will
undoubtedly deliver less control than natural rights advocates view as just and more than
will please those seeking efficiency.231 That practical solution will, therefore, require
acquiescence in outcomes which do not fully (if at all) correspond to one’s personal view
of others just desserts. Conversely, it will limit members resource expectations, meaning
outcomes will routinely fall short of what many view as their just entitlement.

In all probability, therefore, no one will be pleased with most of society’s functionally
derived property law.

Some will view resulting real property rights as incorporating

ridiculously over-broad Taking powers, copyright terms as treating creators with
unbearably shabby disregard, personal information as scandalously abused and
limitations on spending one’s “own” money as an outrageous impairment of free speech.
Others will equally strongly believe preciselythe contrary – that the same Takings law
painfully disregards vital public interests, the same copyright term is fabulously overly
solicitous to authors at unmerited loss of efficiency, the same use of personal information
fails to adequately provide access vital to wealth creation and that the same limitations on
230

Expressive works being unlikely to affect existence itself, life plans become the relevant consideration
– although one should never say never.
231
For those curious (and reasonably so) about whether the functional approach can be pragmatically
translated into actual law, present day copyright offers a real world example. Although not articulated in
functional terms, its existing hybrid nature cannot be coherently explained on normative grounds largely
because it reflects the approaches output constraints. What might be described as natural rights/selfrealization based rights, such as those found in the long-term and moral rights (less obviously so in the
United States but those considerations are clearly influential) look to creator’s need for access to resources
from exploitation and self-definition through control over other’s use. The “efficiency” considerations
provide access to others through the independent creation exclusion and doctrines such as fair use. Explicit
reliance on the functional approach would likely redraw the lines, but the basic output focus is readily
apparent.
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use of personal resources are egregiously insufficient to prevent capture of the political
process.

Additionally, even a good faith willingness to accept personally unsatisfactory results is
not sufficient to overcome the practical difficulties.232 An output focus will require
fundamental and sometimes painfully difficult changes in our approach to public policy
debate. 233 We must cease framing our arguments within the structure of our own logic
and instead learn to state our positions transparently in terms of our motivating values,
desires, needs, concerns and fears so we can understand what the practical solution must
deliver.

We must scrupulously acknowledge, respect and understand others equally

strongly held views regardless of how impossibly absurd or irrelevant they may sound to
us so we will understand that they too are yielding.

And, finally, we must recognize that

even good faith and diligent effort does not mean a workable solution will actually be
found.

Large numbers of us may ultimately decide they cannot accept any of the

identified options or there may simply not be enough to go around.234

The functional alternative hardly offers an encouraging picture. It will result in inelegant
hybrids frequently lacking internal consistency and reflecting no more than a temporary
232

Lincoln’s unsuccessful willingness to bend on the slavery issue offers a particularly good example:
“My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and it is not either to save or to destroy slavery.
If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the
slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would do that also.”
See Von Doren, supra note 7, at 275 (quoting Lincoln’s letter to Horace Greeley).
233
See Chiappetta WTO, supra note 78, at 382-383 (discussing the requirement in the context of
international resolution of the intellectual property exhaustion issue).
234
This problem obviously casts a significant shadow over property. Because no allocation can deliver the
goods, property becomes the means for distinguishing between the have-enoughs and have-inadequates.
The ultimate outcome of that use of property cannot be doubted. See supra notes xx-yy and accompanying
text. That possibility becomes distressingly more likely when property is considered in its international
application (as it eventually must be). See infra note xx.
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and grudging outcome enabling us to continue living cooperatively together at significant
cost to our individual values and beliefs.

The argument, however, is not that we must

accept these results only that their shortcomings should be realistically compared with the
alternative of insisting otherwise. And permitting myself one unabashedly normative
concluding observation – it may be that by actually listening to and trying to understand
each other we might learn something and bywork ing together despite our differences we
might actually find ways which let us live and thrive together peacefully.235

CONCLUSION

Defining property functionally – as the tool implementing society’s decisions allocating
varying kinds and degrees of legal control over its resources – delivers on the practical
goal of clarifying related public policy debate and decision-making. It explains why we
should reject the unproductive conceptualization of property as a right-or-wrong/yes-orno proposition to which we react as well as the assumption that those who disagree with
us are fools or worse. Both characterizations distract us from the central issue in property
law – our persistent normative disagreements regarding what constitutes its just
application. Discussing property as a matter of choice will reveal we believe in a wide
variety of “truths,” thus helping us talk with rather than past each other, but also
235

The international ramifications deserve at least passing mention. Practical solutions depend both on our
ability and willingness to act cooperatively. Accomplishing that task domestically is greatly facilitated by
a shared culture and modes of expression, familiarity with the conflicting norms and the established the
political process, and confidence that ultimately we are linked in our pursuit of a mutually and reciprocally
beneficial common enterprise. Dealing with “outsiders” changes the situation dramatically. Norms will be
unfamiliar and incomprehensible and cultural differences, including modes of expression and methods of
debate increases the likelihood of mistaken assumptions and miscommunication. Most critically, however,
the justifiable lack of confidence that we are actually engaged in a common enterprise poses very serious
risks of unyielding insistence on implementation of one’s own values. See generally, Chiappetta WTO,
supra note 78.
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clarifying that neither reason nor passion can ensure our view prevails.

Finally, by

focusing us on property’s practical effects, the functional approach reveals that the
essential issue framing public debate in heterogeneous society is not how to ensure
society’s adoption and implementation of our personal views but determining which we
value more under the circumstances – our way or the continuation of society. If we chose
the latter, then the pursuit of normative victory should give way to a search for a practical
solution which delivers the goods. Although how we chose to answer the property
question is up to us as individuals, the functional framework permits us to fully
understand the alternatives and their consequences. Not bad work for a definition.
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